How does Iran react to Israel’s killing of Hassan Nasrallah?

Mr. Litvak, did we wake up to a new Middle East on Saturday after the killing of Hassan Nasrallah?

The term “new Middle East” is too broad – the region does not fundamentally change because of the death of one person. But it is definitely an important event and a serious blow to the so-called Iranian “Axis of Resistance”. Nasrallah had a special place in Iranian strategy, but the “Axis” is not destroyed.

Above all, the killing hit Hezbollah hard, which has lost its entire command structure in the last two weeks. In addition, many fighters were seriously injured in the pager attacks. What is much more important, however, is that the Iranians have now seen that Hezbollah has been completely infiltrated by Israel. Iran will therefore carefully consider what role Hezbollah will play in the future.

Hezbollah was the crown jewel in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” – now the Shiite militia is on the verge of collapse. How will Iran react to this?

I am convinced – and perhaps I am wrong – that Iran will not intervene directly at this time. The Iranians will use the Iraqi militias and the Houthis to carry out retaliatory strikes against Israel. The Iranians will hesitate for a very long time before declaring full war on Israel.

Why hasn’t Iran’s calculation changed now?

Because Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, does not want to involve his country in a major war. Iranians are keenly aware of the economic costs of war. In the last week alone I have read several reports saying that Iran is having major electricity supply problems. Tehran has to import gas from Turkmenistan even though it has the world’s second largest gas reserves. The Iranian economy is already doing badly.

Iran’s new President Masoud Pezeshkian in particular has made statements along these lines and convinced Khamenei not to retaliate for the killing of Hamas leader Haniya in Tehran. Nothing has changed about that. Furthermore, Iran’s people are not ready for Iranian soldiers or civilians to die for an Arab leader. What I’m saying now may not be politically correct, but: Iranians don’t want to die for Arabs. Iran’s strategy is to use Arabs to save Iranian lives.

How are the Arab states reacting to the death of Nasrallah?

The celebrations on the streets of northern Syria were predictable. The people there hate Nasrallah because he helped Syrian President Asad kill them. But we haven’t heard any major expressions of grief from the other Sunni states either. Sure, Nasrallah fought against Israel, very well. But he also helped Asad crush the Sunnis in Syria. So there are very mixed feelings about Nasrallah in the Arab world.

It seems as if Iran’s strategy of deterrence against Israel has partially failed – will Tehran now work even harder to get a nuclear bomb?

Mutual deterrence still exists between Israel and Iran. Tehran has 2,000 ballistic missiles, which is a big problem for Israel. It would be very difficult for us to wage a war against Iran. The Iranian missiles serve the purpose of deterrence, which is why a nuclear bomb is not necessary yet – although there are certainly people in the Iranian leadership who now want to develop a nuclear bomb because the pro-Iranian militias in the region are weaker than they thought. By the way: I don’t think Israel is the reason Iran doesn’t have a nuclear bomb yet.

Why not?

In my opinion, the main reason for this is Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, China and Russia. Iran does not want a nuclear race in the region, and it does not want to offend China and Russia.

 

Israel’s fight against Hezbollah is not over even after the killing of Nasrallah – the air force continues to bomb Hezbollah positions massively. What is Israel’s strategy in Lebanon?

Unfortunately, I doubt that Israel has a strategy. On a tactical level, it is clear: Israel wants to reduce Hezbollah’s military capabilities as much as possible. At the same time, Israel could now try to reach a political agreement in Lebanon – for example the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. (The resolution from 2006 stipulates, among other things, the withdrawal of Hezbollah from the immediate border area, editor’s note.) Because Israel will not occupy southern Lebanon again or fundamentally change Lebanon.

The logical step from Israel’s perspective would be to use the current situation to reach a satisfactory political solution. Because it is like Clausewitz said: War is the continuation of politics by other means.

Who should enforce Resolution 1701? The UN peacekeeping force Unifil is obviously unable to do this.

There must be a coalition in Lebanon to enforce the resolution. Perhaps there is a possibility that disappointed Shiites can also take part in this. Nasrallah had always portrayed himself as the protector of Lebanon, but now the destruction of large parts of Lebanon will be his legacy. If the various religious groups in Lebanon and the Lebanese army come together, it could work. I’m not very optimistic, but maybe there is a possibility. One should not be optimistic in the Middle East.