This is how Erdogan turned Syria into his playground

While the civil war in Syria is experiencing a renewed escalation, it appears that the main player who actually remains behind the scenes is the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Behind the smokescreen of the fierce fighting, Erdogan is weaving far-reaching strategic moves that are changing the face of the region.

Throughout the complex military campaign between the rebels and Syrian President Bashar Assad, Erdogan actually established a “protectorate state” in northern Syria – a space he controls through educational institutions that carry out the “Turkification” of the younger generation. In return, the Turkish president provides the rebels with extensive military assistance that allowed them to make quick conquests and free movement in the area. Without him, it would have been difficult to describe the scenes of the flash conquest of the city of Aleppo and the wanderings of jihadists between fighter jets in abandoned Assad army bases.

Globes goes into the depth of the agenda that brought Ankara to promote the move, which includes areas such as dealing with the refugee crisis, the economy, the Kurdish issue and above all – the struggle for regional influence and Erdogan’s political ambitions to extend his rule.

1The refugees and the economy

The civil war in Syria has been going on for about 13 years, but until the rebels took advantage of the moment of opportunity resulting from the severe damage to Hezbollah and the Iranian military shipments through Syria – the world media did not pay attention to what is happening in the divided country. In recent years, the civil war has taken the turn of a war The exhaustion, with quite clear “borders” between all the factors: the Assad regime with the help of Russia and Iran, Turkey through the activation The “Syrian National Army” and cooperation with the Syrian rebel organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and the Kurds with American aid.

The war in such a model did not serve the interests of Erdogan, who is dealing with approximately 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees in his country – and it is likely that the real numbers are much higher. These occupy many jobs, mainly in low-wage jobs that characterize many of the voters of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by the President of Turkey. In the background, the unemployment rate in Turkey is at a 12-year low (8.6% in September), but it is still high and it is obvious that Ankara is having trouble reducing it.

This is one of many figures that influenced Erdogan’s historic defeat in local elections at the end of March, in which his party lost to the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) in all major cities, including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Antalya. At the same time, and no less seriously, the New Welfare Party (YRP), with only four seats in the parliament out of 600, managed to prevail over Erdogan’s bloc with the National Movement Party (MHP) in two districts that are considered his voting centers: in Sanliurfa on the Syrian border, and in Yuzgat in the heart of the country .

This is a major reason why, shortly after, Turkey imposed the trade embargo on Israel, which was revealed in Globes. Erdogan has recently used a series of spins that benefited him and provided false headlines in both the Turkish and Israeli media. The most prominent of which is his vague statement to journalists last month about “severing relations” with Israel, even though the Turkish embassy in Tel Aviv continued to operate as usual.

In the bottom line, it is evident that he is not interested in completely severing relations with Israel. He needs connections with the administration in Jerusalem in order to be involved in talks with Hamas, and leave the ability to influence the Palestinian issue, which is very important in Turkish public opinion.

Although Ankara is quite silent on the subject of their involvement in the negotiations for the deal for the release of the kidnapped with Hamas, US President Joe Biden tweeted on the X network (formerly Twitter) that “over the next few days, the US will make another push with Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, Israel , and the others to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza, which will lead to the release of the abductees and the end of the war and without Hamas ruling.”

When Erdogan is challenged on an issue, he tends to silence the criticism towards him. At a recent conference held by the public broadcasting corporation TRT, which serves as a distinct propaganda arm of Ankara, Islamist demonstrators disrupted Erdogan’s speech and called on him to cut off the supply of Azerbaijani oil to Israel through pipelines that cross Turkey. Those protesters found themselves in prison, for insulting the president.

The Turkish president understands that he is caught between the need to free the economy from the burden of refugees and deporting them to the Assad regime, an action that his voters will not accept due to the Turkish legacy of “concern for the oppressed peoples”. Into the night of considerations, the data of the Turkish Bureau of Statistics also recently entered, indicating that in the second and third quarters the GDP shrank twice by 0.2%. This is the first time since 2018 and the second since 2008-2009 that the Turkish GDP has contracted in two consecutive quarters. In fact, the last drop in GDP was in the second quarter of 2020, in the shadow of the corona virus.

Against the background of the contraction of the Turkish economy, for nine months the interest rate in the country has been at a rate of 50% – which has not been seen in Turkey at any point since Erdogan entered the Prime Minister’s Office in 2003. This was intended to curb inflation, which fell from an annual rate of about 75% in May to about 47% in November. In the corridors of Ankara, they understand that if they are interested in governmental survival, the path to freeing the economy lies in finding a solution that will allow them to send the Syrians back to their country while causing minimal electoral damage, so they directed their affiliates to “cleanse” areas that would allow this.

2The Kurdish issue

The Kurds are the largest stateless people in the world, numbering about 35 million people spread mainly in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In the shadow of the effects of the significant regional upheavals in the previous two decades, as well as the rise and fall of ISIS, today the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) under the leadership of the Kurds control large areas in northern and eastern Syria.

These are strategic areas and are saturated with natural resources, which leads to extensive American support for the Kurds. Today, oil production in Syria is estimated at about 85,000 barrels per day, with about 90% of it produced east of the Euphrates River – in areas controlled by the SDF. This issue causes frustration among all the other parties that are invested in Syria: both the Assad regime and Turkey, a major consumer that is very far from energy independence.

Another layer is the traditional mutual suspicion between Turkey and the Kurds, sometimes due to the terrorist activity of the Kurdish underground (PKK) and sometimes based on pure racism. About a month ago, Erdogan’s coalition partner, Dablat Bahceli, gave a speech in the Turkish parliament in which he suggested that Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the underground who is in prison on the isolated island of Imerli, declare an end to terrorist activity – and in return, a pardon would be considered. Another unusual statement was in another speech, that “if there is a Turk who does not like Kurds, he is not Turkish”.

Every sensible person knows that the Kurds are a weakened society in Turkey, and those who have advanced in society are only those who have abandoned their traditions completely and have undergone Turkification. Among them the former head of the Intelligence Agency (MİT) and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Khan Fidan, who adopted a Turkish look and a matching style of clothing, but his nephew joined the Kurdish underground and fought against the Turkish army in northern Iraq, as reported by the “Pirate” news agency in 2018. In other words, the task of “sweeping” the heritage is not that simple.

Bakhchili’s political activity was carried out in full coordination with Erdogan, in an attempt to harness the Kurdish politicians in Turkey to support constitutional changes, in exchange for Ocalan’s release. Since then, all developments were expected: the Kurdish underground refused, continued the terrorist activity, while Erdogan’s propaganda arms continue to echo the line to the local society that “SDF are PKK” even though this does not reflect reality, to say the least.

Not surprisingly, the Turkish military itself is taking advantage of the military developments in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is an incarnation of Jabhat al-Nusra, a Syrian terrorist organization that was an affiliate of al-Qaeda, and for a long time Ankara tried to hide its relationship with them. On the other hand, when it comes to the Syrian National Army, even the Turkish media recently refers to them as “linked to Turkey”.

The array of forces is fed by the Turks with the separatist Uyghur organization “Islamic Party of Turkistan”. The Uighurs are a Turkish minority group, about 10 million people, the vast majority of whom live in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in China. Now the organization is striving for the independence of Xinjiang from China. It is a Turkish people, and therefore Ankara is using the issue to promote its interests.

Beyond that, all the masks have already fallen in the last few days, when Bayyat Tahrir al-Sham uploads videos of Turkish jihadists who have enlisted in their ranks and use Turkish weapons. It has already been reported that they intend to make the Turkish lira the currency in the area under their control.

With the military progress of the militias, the Turkish army intensified the air and artillery attacks against the SDF, within the same method of presenting them as an annex of the Kurdish underground. At the same time, the pro-Turkish Syrian National Army is also attacking the Kurds. In the long-term goal, the Turkish goal is to make the entire southern side of the Turkey-Syria border under the control of their puppet regime, similar to Turkish Cyprus, but one that can also help them with oil.

3the regional class

Erdogan’s regional policy is fundamentally influenced by two concepts: the Islamist and the nationalist. The president of Turkey is a distinct Muslim Brotherhood man, and this is also the reason for his support for Hamas. Alongside this, Erdoğan sees Turkey as a regional power and all of his actions stem from a desire to return “Atra to its former glory”: to place Turkey in a regional status similar to the time of the Ottoman Empire.

As in many fields, these concepts do not always connect. For a long time, Turkish inflation was even higher than the situation today, and Erdogan steadfastly refused to raise interest rates. However, reluctantly, he had to comply with the holders of the reasonable monetary policy, and in less than a year – the interest rate was raised from 8.5% to 50%. In the case of Islamism versus Turkish nationalism, a war of iron swords does not really connect.

The Turkish interest is for Ankara to have an influence on the Palestinian arena as part of the region, but Erdogan’s Islamist view led to the adoption of measures such as the trade embargo, which removed Turkey from a position of influence. Since then, despite the spins of the Turkish president, Ankara has stabilized its dealings with Israel and is a mediator with Hamas, in the administration’s attempt to bridge between its desire to be a significant regional player and the aspiration to ensure the survival of the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip.

Syria is another arena that has come to bridge the gap between perceptions: among the extremist Sunnis, the jihadists, the Assad regime is seen as an apostate and as one that exists thanks to the backing of the Shiite Iranians and the Christian Russians. Also, among many circles among Turkish nationalists, the Arabs have been seen since the First World War as traitors, due to the cooperation with the countries of the agreement and especially Great Britain. These do not like the Syrians as their neighbors.

With the beginning of the escalation in Syria, I remembered my meeting with a Turkish diplomat about three years ago, in which we discussed that my father was from Turkey and my mother from Aleppo. “Dean, do you know that when the Ottoman army would return from campaigns, then in Aleppo they would say ‘we have arrived home’?” I admitted that I didn’t. And here, this very week, the same Bakhchili who a moment ago talked about how the Kurds are part of Turkey, said in the parliament that “Aleppo is Turkish and Muslim to the core. We are not the only ones who say this, history and geography say so.” Thus, the takeover of large areas in Syria is beneficial in all respects: it radiates Turkish power and influence, and may also enable the removal of unwanted neighbors.

4All roads lead to the ballot box

The referendum that took place in Turkey in 2017 not only resulted in a change from a parliamentary to a presidential regime, but it also ruled that the president could serve two terms. Erdoğan has served as president since 2014, but as in countless cases, the constitution was interpreted according to the convenience of the president of Turkey. Therefore, it was determined that in his case the limit of two terms will apply to two election systems. These took place in 2018 and 2023, and Erdogan already declared in March that this is his last term.

Wonder and wonder, or not, today the discourse is completely different and proves that the Turkish president’s statement was tantamount to “hold me”. The attempt to harness the Kurds to change the constitution stemmed from the same clause of the two-term limit for the president. The magnitude of the failure was not hidden, despite the silencing mechanism in Erdogan’s propaganda machine, whether it is the state news agency Anadolu or whether it is an innocent-looking media outlet with polished English like “Middle East Eye”.

However, Erdogan and his people always worry about a plan B. The President of Turkey has the authority to announce early elections, and such a situation will not be counted as another term. Today, all the areas listed here connect to the working model of the Turkish president: all roads lead to the ballot box. He wants to maximize the duration of the current term, which should end in 2028, and is therefore taking time.

The intense fighting in Syria came for him at a time when he has no time pressure, and if he now announces snap elections and is elected again – the beginning of the term will be in 2025. Therefore, he can afford to take his time, let the fighting continue, promote an extensive “voluntary” return project of Syrian refugees back to their country, and only announce early elections in 2026-2027.