Venezuela today | One million more migrants, a deeper economic crisis and more precarious services: what awaits Venezuela in the face of the renewal of Nicolás Maduro’s dictatorship

The usurpation of power by the regime led by Nicolas Maduro has frustrated the hopes of thousands of Venezuelans who dreamed of both political and economic improvement in their country. This new period of the Chavista dictatorship, denounced by various governments, including that of Peru, would bring with it a new wave of migrants that in turn would encounter the United States once again governed by Republican Donald Trump, from whom a much more migratory policy is expected. more restrictive.

What other loads does it carry? Venezuelawhere the economy sinks more every day and basic social services remain in an endless spiral of precariousness, in the face of this new six-year term of Maduro?

The incessant diaspora

According to figures from the refugee agency UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)just over 8.5 million Venezuelans have left their country during the last decade, a number that could increase by up to one million more in 2025. The majority of migrants and refugees from Venezuela reside in our region (6.70 million in December 2024).

Among the countries with the highest volume of Venezuelan immigration are Colombia (2.8 million) and Peru (1.7 million), according to the UN. According to the Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), at least 85% of Venezuelan migrants are in Latin America.

Venezuelan migration in the last decade is already greater, for example, than all the inhabitants of Paraguay (6.5 million). At the end of 2023, the Venezuelan Diaspora Observatory (ODV) indicated that the migratory flow was distributed in 90 countries and more than 400 cities around the world.

The political dispute

Although Chavismo reduces Venezuelan migration to 2.5 million and assures that 1.2 million have already returned, the opposition led by diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia blames the government of Nicolás Maduro for the diaspora and advocates a change of government to generate return opportunities.

This last scenario seems unlikely despite very serious doubts about the validity of the official results of last year’s elections. And the fact is that González, 75, has had an arrest warrant since September of last year, for charges related to the public exhibition of the electoral records through a digital platform, which is why he lives in asylum in Spain.

Chavismo also offers a reward of $100,000 for information to capture the teacher, former diplomat and writer. Diosdado Cabello, Minister of Interior Relations, Justice and Peace, has said several times that if Edmundo González “sets foot in Venezuela, he will be arrested.”

The difficulties of the next six-year term

Everything seems to indicate that, as since 2013, the government of Nicolás Maduro will continue to be marked by a deep economic crisis, internal political tensions and growing international isolation.

There are many ways to explain the migration crisis in Venezuela, but in didactic terms it is possible to summarize them in three powerful problems: political (autocracy and repression), economic (collapse and hyperinflation) and humanitarian (lack of basic services).

This situation, exacerbated by international sanctions (United States) and political instability, drives the massive emigration of Venezuelans, which is also aggravated by new rising migratory flows from Cuba, Haiti and even Ecuador.

The economic contraction

A forced migration crisis the size of the Venezuelan one points mainly to a precarious state of basic social services and an increasingly contracted economy. President Nicolás Maduro recently assured that Venezuela’s economy grew 5.5% in 2023.

This supposed progress contrasts with what has been experienced in the country in the last decade. The Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) itself admitted that between 2013 and 2018 the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted 52.3%, and the decline continued strongly in 2019.

The economic contraction bottomed out between 2014 and 2021, reaching up to 70%. From then on, the Government built bridges with the private sector, allowed informal dollarization and opened the borders for commercial supplies. However, it has not been enough.

Oil, currency and industry

Regarding oil production, although it increased by 19.8% – up to 960,000 barrels per day (bpd) – last November compared to the same month in 2023, it still remains far from the 2.89 million bpd that it pumped at beginning of the century.

On the other hand, private industrial production showed an increase of 7.6% in the third quarter of 2024 and manufacturing reached a used capacity of 43.8%. However, the figures are still far from being positive. When Maduro took power in 2013, the use of installed capacity was at 70%.

With a new Maduro government, the business sector is watching and waiting to resist any abrupt changes in internal and external policies. Finally, exchange and price volatility is another pending issue: according to projections, the exchange gap would remain above 20%, which will increase the volatility in the prices of goods and services, once again leaving the private sector in check.

That is to say, the dollar is increasingly worth more in Venezuela and its currency, the bolivar, is increasingly worth less. This increases inflation and with it, the discontent of the people.

The lack and the need

The economic collapse and high inflation seem to condemn Venezuelans to live in poverty. The continuous cuts in the supply of electricity and drinking water complicate the daily lives of its inhabitants, who see how these deficiencies in basic services have consequences on other equally transcendental services such as the health sector and education.

The Living Conditions Survey (Encovi) of 2023 indicates that 51.9% of Venezuelan households live in poverty multidimensional, characterized by low income, lack of basic services and deterioration in education.

Income inequalities are also irrefutable evidence of a crisis that has not been mitigated: the average per capita income of the poorest stratum is 10 dollars a month, that of the highest stratum is 347.2 dollars, according to Encovi. The main response of the Maduro government (to almost 80% of the population) has been the delivery of solidarity bonuses.

Corruption and crime

According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in the public sector, with a scale from zero (very corrupt) to 100 (very low corruption), Venezuela obtained 13 points, becoming the second most corrupt country in the world at the beginning of 2024, only surpassed by Somalia.

Systematic embezzlement of funds and kidnapping of public powers have dynamited state entities and with it public spending. “Major corruption schemes go hand in hand with the capture of the legislative, regulatory and judicial systems by high-level officials to generate power and evade punishment,” warned the 2023 annual report of Transparency International (TI).

Bribery and impunity for crimes are other characteristics that have established themselves in the last decade. According to the NGO Provea, between 2013 and 2023, under the government of Nicolás Maduro, There were 1,652 victims of torture, 7,309 victims of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and 10,085 murders committed by security agents (Provea 2024).

So that there are no doubts about the difficult social context that Venezuelans face, According to the World Atlas of Impunity, out of 163 countries, Venezuela ranks 11th, with one of the highest rates of impunity worldwide.

In summary, the new government will face the challenge of economic reconstruction at the head of a country devastated by years of hyperinflation, recession and international sanctions. For this, it will be crucial to reactivate the oil industry and promote new industrial sectors.

Added to this is the massive humanitarian crisis due to the shortage of food, medicine and basic services. Finally, it is urgent to restore trust in institutions, essential for the development of effective public policies and reintegration into the global economy. If the above is at least mitigated, the mass migration projected for 2025 could be stopped.

Meanwhile, political uncertainty, economic volatility and social pressure will continue to prevail in what was one of the richest countries in Latin America during the 1970s.

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