How the Mercosur-European Union agreement impacts when it is applied in a “provisional” manner

The president of the European Commission announced this week that she will apply provisionally the Mercosur-European Union agreement after ratification by the parliaments of Argentina and Uruguay, as allowed by a previous mandate given to it by the European Council.

While the Argentine government, also determined, sent to Brussels the notification that Congress had approved the law of the agreement and President Javier Milei had promulgated it in record time, Von der Leyen specified that The administrative process will take at least two months. Thus, on May 1 the agreement would start provisionally.

He impact in Argentina of the provisional approval could be verified gradually with the start of negotiations on quotas granted for the tariff reduction in a huge amount of products that can be exported to the EU with lower tariffs or even no tariffs.

Now there should be meetings in the Southern Cone bloc to start distributing those quotas that were granted jointly by the agreement and not individually by country, experts say.

Meanwhile, European justice is analyzing the text that the European Parliament sent to it in January, after it was signed by the two regions in Asunción. Due to this delay, Von der Leyen requests its provisional application, angry some members with whom They reject the agreement, like France.

Experts agree that the political impact and timing of the provisional application by the Commission – resolved by mandate of the Council – is a political maneuver that seeks to activate economic benefits before the final resolution of the European Parliament and justice.

For Argentina, this implies that some effects will be immediate (parts of liberalizations and certain quotas), but many changes will take years to fully materialize. Furthermore, legal uncertainty in the EU maintains a risk of future revocation or modification if the courts or Parliament demand changes.

According to an academic work carried out by the Foreign Ministry years ago, although the EU’s participation in Argentine trade was reduced between 2000 and 2025 (exports to the EU went from 17% to 9.7% and imports from 21.7% to 13.8%), Europe had been the third destination and origin of Argentine foreign trade, behind Brazil and China.

This relative weight, even diminished, turns any change in access rules into a strategic opportunity.

However, there are tariff asymmetries relevant: the EU applies lower average tariffs (MFN 5.5%) than Argentina (13.3%), especially on non-agricultural goods. The EU still maintains strong protections and non-ad valorem tariffs on sensitive agro-industrial products. That imbalance It conditions both the expectations and the risks of the agreement for Argentine industry and agriculture.

What the agreement offers: broad but gradual liberalization

The commercial core of the treaty implies extensive liberalization: the EU liberalizes 95.1% of the tariff lines and 91% of the value of its imports from Argentina within a maximum period of ten years, combining immediate and phased reliefs. In commercial value, 69.5% is deducted upon entry into force; the rest is released progressively (8.4% at 4 years; 3.6% at 7–8 years; 9.6% at 10 years). Only 0.1% of trade is excluded; 8.9% will be subject to tariff quotas.

Sectorally, the EU liberalizes 100% of industrial goods (50% of Argentine manufacturing without tariffs at the beginning; 50% in up to 10 years). In agroindustry, liberalization reaches 87.6% in up to ten years; 12.2% is within quotas or preferences and 0.1% is excluded.

Potential winners

According to the text of the agreement, the following are the “winning” sectors, although the quotas must be distributed among the members of the bloc and, for nowit cannot be established how much will correspond to Argentina.

  • Agroexports with a track record: meats (beef, poultry, pork within quotas), fish and shellfish, wine, honey, peanuts, olive oil, blueberries and leather. Negotiated quotas facilitate preferential access and reduce initial barriers.
  • Manufactures and products with complementarity: auto parts, combed cotton yarn, aluminum alloy wire, polypropylene pipes; The liberalization of industrial goods can open markets that were previously inaccessible due to high tariffs.
  • Products benefited by agricultural quotas: corn and sorghum, rice, honey (45,000 tons), dairy and ethanol, among others.

Risks and limitations

  • Fees and conditions: many accesses are for limited volumes that limit the massive expansion of exports and maintain uncertainty about the sustainability of significant increases in the medium term.
  • Structural asymmetries: Argentina continues to apply higher average tariffs, especially in non-agricultural ones, where its rates make reciprocal competition difficult; In addition, the EU maintains high tariffs in sensitive sectors (dairy, sugar, beverages and tobacco).

Marcelo Elizondo, president of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Argentina, states that the agreement “will change the matrix of Mercosur through the first major trade agreement of the South American bloc” and will enhance the interest in attracting investments. Due to its territorial scope, it is emerging as the largest trade agreement in the world. “Until now, Mercosur had only closed partial or smaller-scale agreements, mainly with neighboring countries like Chile.”

Elizondo agrees with other experts who have supported this agreement for decades. Broadly speaking, it states that it serves to eliminate barriers that affect or reduce trade between the areas that sign the treaty, promotes the conditions for fair competition, increases investment opportunities, provides adequate protection for intellectual property rights, establishes effective processes for the stimulation of national production and healthy competition, encourages cooperation between members and offers dispute resolution.

Diplomatic surnames from Argentine diplomacy and politics ranging from Chighizola, Redrado, Chiaradía, Kreckler, Reyser, Cima, Raimondi, De la Guardia have been working on this agreement for years. Whether as national negotiators or as specialized political and career officials.

By Editor