Even without waiting for Trump: the stealthy future that Erdogan is building on

While Turkey continues to pressure Washington to return to the F35 program, Ankara is simultaneously promoting its own ambitious alternative: the KAAN stealth fighter jet. For President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it is much more than an aviation project. This is a strategic, industrial and political move designed to upgrade the Turkish Air Force, to reduce the gap compared to countries that have already advanced to more advanced generations of fighter jets – and to place Turkey in the limited club of countries capable of developing an advanced 5th generation fighter jet.

The last push for the project came precisely from Washington. The Trump administration’s intention to sell dozens of F110 engines made by General Electric to the Turks is seen in Ankara as a lifeline for KAAN: without engines available, the project had difficulty moving forward at the pace Turkey had planned. According to the reports, Ankara has already received a first shipment of engines in the past, and is now seeking to complete a more extensive procurement, which will allow to expand the number of prototypes and advance trials.

Behind the KAAN project, or by its other name MMU, there is a real operational problem: the Turkish Air Force is aging. The bulk of its power is still based on American F16 aircraft that were taken over in the 90s, alongside even older F4 aircraft. Despite local and American upgrades over the years, Ankara understands that this fleet is far from keeping up with the pace of regional armaments.

The gap is especially noticeable against the background of what is going on around Turkey: Israel has been operating operational F35 squadrons for years, Greece is moving towards receiving F35s and has also purchased Rafale aircraft, and other countries in the region – from Qatar to the United Arab Emirates – have also armed themselves with more advanced fighter jets. In the eyes of Ankara, the meaning is twofold: both an old fleet that requires replacement, and a fear of losing the relative advantage over rivals and neighbors.

This lesson, as far as the Turks are concerned, became even more acute after the recent campaign between Israel and Iran, and in particular in light of the renewed emphasis in the region on the importance of air superiority, the ability to operate in depth, stealth, electronic warfare and the fusion of intelligence. Ankara understands that if it wants to continue to conduct an independent and assertive foreign policy from Syria to the eastern Mediterranean – it cannot afford to be left behind in the air. The increasing reliance on advanced UAVs did not deliver the goods either.

“The gap is not only compared to Israel,” says Dr. Rami Daniel, an expert on Turkey from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), in an interview with N12 magazine. “Turkey is stuck in generation 4, while other countries have advanced to generation 4.5 with the Rafale, or even to generation 5 with the F35. There is a gap here against many players in the region – and some of them, like Greece, are players that Turkey sees as rivals.”

According to him, for Ankara it is also an attempt to correct a strategic mistake. At the end of the last decade, the Americans excluded the Turks from the F35 project, after the latter decided to purchase 400-S surface-to-air missile systems, made in Russia. “Because of the purchase of the S-400, Turkey found itself outside the F35 project and without a real solution to the obsolescence of its air fleet. There is also a gap here compared to other countries, also a need to correct a mistake that Erdogan made himself, and also a propaganda matter that the regime is using.”

The KAAN project was not born only from the crisis with the US. According to Daniel, it is also based on an old Turkish view that the country cannot afford to depend on others whenever it encounters security challenges. “Turkey has felt over the years that whenever it has to face a challenge like this, its partners cause problems for it in terms of weapons,” he explains. “It felt this in Cyprus in the 1970s, and against the Kurds in the 1980s and the 1990s, and from there the concept arose that Turkey should be able to produce the mineral oil it needs by itself.”

The idea of ​​a Turkish fighter jet “has been in the air for many years”, but received renewed momentum after the withdrawal from the F35 program. Turkey was not only a customer of the American plane, but a partner in the project, invested in it, and parts of it were supposed to be produced on its territory. The purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system changed everything: Washington believed that it made no sense to allow Turkey to simultaneously possess both F35 aircraft and a Russian system aimed at filming them, and feared the disclosure of sensitive information about the American stealth to Russia.

“Turkey is trying to take everything that can be taken,” says Daniel. “She buys a Eurofighter from the Europeans, develops her own plane that she claims is the best, and at the same time begs the Americans to give her an F35. It’s not a sign of strength. It’s more a sign of pressure.”

The KAAN prototype took off for the first time in 2024, and in Turkey it is presented as the country’s first national fighter plane – a symbol of technological ability, sovereignty and the ambition to provide a local alternative to foreign fighter planes. According to the design, it is a twin-engine aircraft with 5th generation characteristics: a lower signature, advanced sensors, the ability to carry advanced weapons and a large operational range. In Turkey they even stated that the plane should reach a maximum speed of Mach 1.8 – more than the F35.

But behind the statements hides a faltering project: KAAN is still far from being an operational aircraft, its cost is astronomical, and it relies on foreign components in critical areas, primarily engines. “You have to be careful of the gap between the propaganda and reality,” says Daniel. “It is a flagship project with a very large symbolic weight, so it is sometimes difficult to separate the lies that the Turks tell themselves or the world and the actual situation.”

This is why the American engines are so significant. Although Turkey presents KAAN as a national project, it still does not have a local engine due to its lack of resources. “The Turkish military industry has really developed a lot, and it cannot be denied,” says Daniel. “But it went a lot to the width and not necessarily to the depth. There are critical technologies that, despite everything, still come from abroad – and the engines are one of the most prominent examples. This shows that Turkey has not yet achieved its stated goal.”

Despite the investment in KAAN, Turkey did not give up on the original goal: return to the F35 project. For Ankara, KAAN is a long-term solution – not an immediate solution. The F35 offers capabilities that Turkey will have difficulty quickly replicating on its own: mature stealth, information fusion, advanced electronic warfare, network capability, and cumulative operational experience. “The fact that despite all the public and pompous statements Erdogan still wants an F35, still buys a Eurofighter and is still trying to get American engines – shows that he also probably understands that KAAN will not provide the solution satisfactorily, at least in the coming years,” says Daniel.

KAAN also has an important role in the intra-Turkish arena. In Erdogan’s eyes, this is a project that serves the narrative he has been building for years: Turkey as an independent, strong power, capable of developing advanced weapons systems on its own. “If you go to Erdogan’s Twitter account, you will see him wearing a flight suit – a photo taken from the ceremony where the first model of KAAN was presented,” says Daniel. “It shows how important this issue is to him, even at the level of the narrative.”

Turkey also sees KAAN as a future export product. Ankara has already signed a deal with Indonesia to supply 48 aircraft in the next decade, and there are reports of interest from other countries. But the gap between a test flight and an operational plane is still big. “A 5th generation plane is a very complex system,” Daniel mentions. “It is not enough to produce a prototype. You have to produce in quantity, train pilots, build a maintenance system, diagnose faults and accumulate flight hours.”

From an Israeli point of view, the most worrying scenario is a Turkish return to the F35. But also progress in KAAN, or extensive procurement of Eurofighter and F16 upgrades, will significantly improve the situation of the Turkish Air Force. “It is clear that it is better for Israel that Turkey invests in trying to develop KAAN than to receive an F35 squadron,” Daniel clarifies. “But the Israeli perception today is that any strengthening of Turkey is negative for Israel. Therefore, both the engines, and the possibility that Turkey will receive technology and move forward with its project – should be of concern.”

Now the question that worries not only Ankara but also Jerusalem is not only what will happen to the KAAN project, but whether US President Donald Trump decides to reopen the door to Turkey on the way back to the F35 program. According to reports, the White House is willing in principle to examine such a move – provided that Turkey separates from the Russian S-400 systems it has purchased. For Israel, this is the most worrying scenario: a proven, advanced American stealth aircraft and operational, which may end up in the hands of an increasingly extreme government.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is already trying to block this possibility. In recent days, he was interviewed twice by the American Fox network, attacked Erdogan who threatened to occupy Jerusalem, emphasized Turkey’s ties with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood movement – and also brought up the F35 issue on his own initiative. The message to Trump was clear: returning Turkey to the program would not only be a tribute to Erdogan, but a move that could affect the entire regional balance of power. The question is how Trump, who showered Erdogan with warm words and walked arm in arm with him in Ankara, which is hosting the NATO summit, is attentive to these warnings.

Either way, even if Erdogan doesn’t get the American plane he wants soon, he’s not going to be left behind. The KAAN project was accelerated out of a crisis – the removal from the F35, the aging of the fleet and the need to close gaps – but it has become a broader symbol: of Turkey’s regional ambition, of its efforts to upgrade its air power, and of Erdogan’s attempt to present his country as an independent security power even in an era when it still needs engines, technology and approvals from the West.