The history of the Israeli debate on what to do in Lebanon

Does a country have to be strong to exist? Or maybe her only chance to exist stems from her inherent weakness? It’s almost a paradox, a joke, isn’t it. But he represents the history of Lebanon in its 80 years of independence, real or imagined.

It emerged from the womb of collapsing French colonialism in 1943, long before the French really planned to grant it independence. But the “State of Lebanon” was planned even before. The French and the Lebanese spent three years writing its constitution, back in the late 1920s. The formula they found was so convoluted, so full of contradictions, that its success depended entirely on the reluctance of its constituents to destroy it, and the willingness of much more powerful neighbors to allow it to exist.

Syria, for example, which was ejected into the world at the same time, refused to accept the very idea of ​​a separate “Lebanese” identity. She thought that this so-called “Lebanon” should be part of “Greater Syria”. Syria has refused to establish normal diplomatic relations with Lebanon for decades. If the Lebanese want to talk to her, let them be honored and go on the King’s Road from Beirut to Damascus.

The idea of ​​”Lebanon” was conceived by Europeans in the middle of the 19th century. They did so mainly to serve imperial interests. But there was both romance and sincere affection for the locals. Colonialism was often exploitative and rude, but occasionally also generous and even altruistic.

The first man who came up with the idea of ​​a state on “Mount Lebanon” was Colonel Charles Henry Churchill, the British consul in Damascus for ten years (1842-1852). While there he also conceived the idea of ​​establishing a Jewish state in the Land of Israel, and even shared it with the most prominent Jewish leader in Britain, Moshe Montefiore. The colonel, like many of his successors, hoped that a new map would create a new Middle East.

A weak-strong Lebanon was not pleasing to her eyes. 15 years after its independence, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser tried to destroy the Luluian formula of its existence, and to control its allies over it. A brief civil war ended with the restoration of the status quo, with the help of the US Sixth Fleet.

Eshkol warns, Rabin executes

It seems that the difficulty of understanding what Lebanon is and what it is not was at the foundation of its relations with its neighbors, especially the southern ones. A sovereign country with a defined government, with an army, with respectable diplomacy and prosperous banking, sometimes gave the impression that it was responsible for everything that happened on its territory.

Flipping through Israeli newspapers in the mid-1960s illustrates the dissonance. On October 28, 1965, “Eshkol warns Lebanon following the sabotage of ‘Al Fatah'”, which then took its first steps. 24 hours later: “IDF forces blew up a house and three wells in rural Lebanon from where they went into Israel.” This was the first Israeli military action against Lebanese territory since 1948.

“Maariv” then quoted the Chief of Staff, Major General Yitzhak Rabin: “We wanted to tell the Lebanese residents that if there is no peace on our border, there will be no peace on their border either.” Lebanon is not immune to an Israeli reaction, and proof of this was the operation, which aimed to warn and warn the villages from which the terrorists left and to which they returned.” The Maariv military reporter accurately described the operation, until the forces reached “three wells on the side of […]from the third pit the soldiers heard wading water.”

Two days later, the newspaper reported that the southern delegates in the Lebanese parliament demanded that the government “train and arm all the male residents of the border villages, so that they can defend their homes.” The attack “caused an uproar in Lebanese public opinion […] And gave an opening here for anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish statements.”

Prime Minister and Defense Minister Levi Eshkol explained that “a non-response would have resulted in increased ‘El Fatah’ activity.”

Three years later, a Joint Chiefs of Staff patrol raided Beirut’s airport and blew up 12 Lebanese passenger planes in response to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s attack on an El Al passenger plane. The international condemnation was overwhelming. The United States, in the last days of the presidency of Lyndon G. Venson, strictly pro-Israeli, joined in the condemnation. There is no evidence that the Lebanese government had anything to do with the attack on El Al, Washington said.

Damage to the foundations of Lebanon

The expectations for normal behavior of Lebanon did not align with its nature and the reasons for its existence. Wisdom after the fact came back and proved that Lebanon, even when it exists on paper, is not able to exercise its sovereignty. Time after time Israel punished it, and in doing so played an important, if unintentional, role in its downfall.

If in 1965 they were just beginning to think in South Lebanon about the need for a militia to defend the villages against Israel, here in 1982 the thoughts became flesh and blood after Israel’s invasion. To some extent we are now dealing with the long-term consequences of the three well explosion.

Of course, the current war was imposed on Israel more than any other war in its history. She is defensive. But while defending it, voices are emanating from Israel, giving the impression that the lessons of the past have not been learned. They call to “punish the state of Lebanon”, because it “allows Hezbollah” to use its territory.

The former head of the Mossad, Major General Danny Yatom, called on Tuesday (in an interview on Channel 2 with Eran Sikorl and Yair Weinerv) to attack infrastructure in Lebanon, in order to punish it for running out of hands, “because a significant part of the infrastructure is also used by Hezbollah, so in retrospect if you hit the ports , if you damage the electricity network, if you damage the water network, you also damage Hezbollah, beyond the fact that you damage the foundations of the Lebanese state.”

The damage to the “foundations of the Lebanese state” is therefore passed on from generation to generation, even though history unequivocally proves its futility. None of the previous attacks produced the expected results. What is the point of punishing someone who is unable to learn the lessons of his punishment?

The practical inability to hold a sovereign state accountable for actions that take place within its borders is of course a source of frustration and loss of advice. What to do in a country that exists only on paper?

The biggest danger is that another slight push, let alone a heavy push, will put an end to even the appearance. What will happen if the damage to the infrastructure simply transfers the country, not only in fact but also in law, to Hassan Nasrallah? Would an open Hezbollah state be a more convenient partner, or a more rational one?

States were not meant to last forever: the Soviet Union, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Yemen, United Ethiopia (with Eritrea) ceased to exist. At the moment it is quite clear that Lebanon is not a candidate for cancellation. The US will not allow Israel to adopt the doctrine of the orphaned man. The weak Lebanon, or actually the three weak ones, is destined to add and occupy a spot on the map of the Middle East for at least some time to come.