Most of the prominent wars of the last 125 years were not decisively decided on the battlefield. They were wars of attrition, and the losers were those who lost their strength first. The longest war of attrition, the one we call World War I, was still a stationary war of trenches in Europe, four years after it began.
The Korean, Vietnam and Afghanistan wars lasted years. Korea came close to deciding, but the wheel turned again on the leaders, and it ended in a draw. The failure of the Americans in Vietnam became apparent about two years after their departure. Israel was in the ‘first’ Lebanon for 18 years, and it took 6 to 23 years to overcome its complete failure.
Russia’s war against Ukraine is destined to end within days. No one imagined in February 2022 that it would still be raging a thousand days later. Outside of two short periods, in its first month and in its seventh month, it was an almost stationary war of attrition. Now it has some mobility, and the Russians are occupying villages and towns on the eastern front, creeping and by the way with terrible losses. Estimates in recent days put the number of Russian casualties at 1,500 to 2,000 per day, killed and wounded.
Both sides made attempts to decide the balance in a knockout – in vain. Each of them sacrificed thousands of soldiers during the idle attempts. But that doesn’t mean we’re watching the draw. The balance is tipped in Russia’s favor. The task of the Ukrainian army is no longer to launch a counterattack, not even to stop it. On the eastern front, his main, or only, task is to slow down the pace of the enemy’s advance.
Biden’s missile clearance
On the 1,000th day of this bogus war, the Biden administration finally lifted the ban on the use of ATACMS, long-range US-made missiles, against military targets on Russian soil. The ban has not been officially lifted, but Ukraine has already launched seven such missiles at the Bryansk region, near the border.
Since the lifting of the ban was not announced, it was also not officially explained. It seems to be mainly related to the appearance of the North Korean expeditionary force in the Kursk region, a small part of which the Ukrainians captured four months ago. It is possible that it is related to the escalation of Russian ballistic attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. And it is related to the fact that the elections are over, and the defeated administration is politically immune from Trump’s accusations that he is fomenting a “third world war”. The president-elect remained silent, at least until Wednesday morning.
Vladimir Putin updated Russia’s nuclear doctrine this week. From now on, it will be able to use nuclear weapons to defend against an attack by “a non-nuclear state, which is an ally of a nuclear state.” In other words, almost every European country is now a legitimate target.
No one has any idea what Donald Trump will do as soon as he enters the White House. He came back and talked over the years about the added value of “unpredictable” behavior. What would be “unpredictable” about his behavior? Will he rush to drop the ground from under Ukraine’s feet, or will he try to show muscle in front of Putin?
War until victory?
The most important question on the thousand and one day of the war is Ukraine’s resilience. The signs do not bode well. A grim weariness takes over her.
A Gallup poll, published this week, shows that 52% of Ukrainians want immediate negotiations to end the war. Only 38% are interested in ‘war until victory’. This is a steep drop from 73% in 2022 and from 63% in 2023.
Ukraine does not publish regular updates of its losses, but the number is estimated at 300 to 400 thousand, dead and wounded. Russia’s total losses are estimated at 725 thousand, dead and wounded.
An investigation by the Russian service of the BBC reveals this week a chilling picture of demoralization in Ukraine. The investigators estimate that since Russia invaded in February 2022, a tenth of the Ukrainian soldiers have defected, almost 100 thousand.
Senior government officials attribute the wave of defections to “growing fatigue due to the lack of rotation, or a clear definition of the terms of service.” Also mentioned are “command errors, which led to deaths that could have been avoided, and the reassignment of recruits to positions where they had no experience”, such as the placement of engineering unit personnel for combat missions.
One deserter is quoted there: “We had heavy losses, we were exhausted and sick, and we were waiting to be replaced. We were told to go to the front, dig in next to enemy tanks and sit quietly like mice. When we refused, they threatened us and treated us with contempt.” Only a small percentage of the defectors are caught, put on trial and convicted. The authorities offer to return them to the service without being punished, and many do return. But the circumstances that produced their defection have not changed.
According to an estimate by the United Nations, the population of Ukraine, which stood at approximately 44 million before the war, has decreased by a quarter since its beginning. The direct damage to the economy was estimated at the end of last year at 151 billion dollars. The reconstruction of the ruins will cost almost half a trillion dollars, 2.8 times the Ukrainian GDP In 2023, the war costs Ukraine 140 million dollars a day, and the share of defense in the next year’s budget will be 26%.
Hands working or shooting
Two economists, a British and a Ukrainian, write this week in the American magazine ‘Foreign Policy’, about the weaknesses of the Russian war economy. Despite all efforts, it is unable to meet the army’s armament needs. About half of all shells in Russia are produced in North Korea. “At some point in the second half of 2025, Russia will encounter serious difficulties in several weapon categories,” they say.
Russia loses an average of 100 tanks and 220 artillery pieces per month. It is not able to produce more than 20 artillery barrels per month. As such, Russia has lost nearly 5,000 APCs since the start of the war, but is only able to produce 17 APCs a month. Furthermore, Russia is able to produce three million shells a year, a quarter of what it served in 2022.
To meet these huge tasks, Russian industry needs workers. But employment in Russia is almost full. The choice is between working hands and shooting hands. The army needs 30,000 new recruits a month to fill its dwindling ranks.
The two economists come to the conclusion that Russia will not be able to bear the burden of the war beyond the middle of next year. “Contrary to the myth of Russia’s indomitable resources, the Kremlin’s armies are far from invincible,” they write. “But in order to defeat Russia, a degree of Western patience and commitment is required, which is questionable due to the combination of the hesitation of the Western leaders and the political instability.”
The pending question is who will still be standing on their feet in November 2025. The likelihood of “Western patience and commitment” to help Ukraine add and stand is not high.