They created a global threat and began to break away from the Iranian axis. What do the Houthis want?

14 months into the war: peace in Lebanon has been maintained, the fighting in Gaza is of low intensity and the launches from Iraq have decreased. However, the Houthi rebels do not stop for a moment. Early Saturday morning, a ballistic missile was launched from Yemen, which hit the Tel Aviv area and injured 16 civilians, and last week alarms were set off in many cities in the center of the country following the launch of another ballistic missile from Yemen, which brought millions of Israelis into protected areas.

Throughout the war, the Houthis conducted themselves as one with Iran. But now, when there is a trend of relaxation, they continue the same offensive line. Israel’s entry into the buffer zone on the Syrian border constitutes a reason for the Houthis to go to war – even though the step taken by Iran is generally a withdrawal from the country, following the fall of the Assad regime. On the face of it, it seems that while Tehran’s regional power structure is collapsing, the Houthis continue a militant line against the West. Did they turn from a pro-Iranian militia into an independent militia?

“‘Iranization’ causes dissatisfaction”

The rulers of Sana’a are indeed Shiites, but they are not from the same faction of the Ayatollah regime. The Iranians are Jafari Shiites – the most common school in the Shiite world – while the Houthis are Zaydis. Inbal Nissim Lovton, a researcher of modern Yemen at the Open University, explains that the relationship between the parties is not a natural alliance, but much more pragmatic in accordance with the overlapping interests: the attitude towards the West, the US and Israel. The entire Zaydi establishment supports this. This causes, at the very least, displeasure in some of the Houthis’ ranks. I’m not sure because everyone aligns with great joy, and at least some of them would be happy for the effect to decrease.”

Dr. Yoel Gozhansky, head of the regional arena at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), adds that “the independence of the Houthis has always existed, and Iranian control over them was not as tight as it was over Hezbollah and the Assad regime. The degree of coordination is not clear now, and it is possible that Iran has an interest in presenting that the axis is active – despite the situation.” Nissim Lovton points out that the Houthis first of all serve themselves: “They act in a way that serves themselves first, even if it does not necessarily connect Literally one to one for Iranian interests. We saw this in the warming of Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia in 2023 and the mutual opening of embassies mediated by the Chinese. The Iranians asked the Houthis to lower their profile, but they continued to hit coalition targets.”

Benny Sabati, an Iran researcher at INSS, emphasizes that even during the cease-fire with Hezbollah, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated that the “resistance” would continue, and offers an alternative explanation for the Houthis’ behavior: “‘Resistance’ is the supreme goal for Iran. Along the way there is Tactical truces, sometimes they apply to all and sometimes to some. There are also vague orders that allow partial freedom for remote militias like the Houthis.”

No longer a regional problem

Unlike the other arms of the Iranian octopus, at a relatively early stage in the war the Houthis created a global threat. Their strategic location north of Bab al-Mandab – the southern gateway to the Red Sea through which 14% of the world’s maritime trade passed – allowed them to disrupt traffic in the area.

As a result, they led to the disruption of maritime trade routes, with ships having to bypass Africa via the Cape of Good Hope, instead of crossing the Red Sea – which lengthens supply chains by at least two weeks. The one who was severely affected by this situation is Egypt, which until the war was the source of 2% of its GDP. The head of the Suez Canal Authority said that the canal’s revenue in the fiscal year 2023-2024 was $7.2 billion – a significant decrease from $9.4 billion the previous year.

Dr. Gozhansky explains that “the Houthis will continue to be a security problem for the world because of several parameters: the sit-in on Bab al-Mandab; the proximity to a significant oil producer, Saudi Arabia; and their capabilities that come from Iran alongside the development of independent capabilities.”

The Houthi activity has not only disrupted global trade, but also to Yemen itself. The Yemeni government recognized by the international community is based in Aden, and according to the World Bank, in the first half of the year 42% of its fiscal revenues were affected. The damage to oil exports and reliance on product imports led to the erosion of the Yemeni Rial in Aden from 1,619 to the dollar in January to 1,917 in August. At the same time, citizens in different districts of Yemen reported a shortage of food products. According to the IMF, the Yemeni GDP is expected to contract by 1% in 2024, after a contraction of 2% last year.