US and Philippine marines arrived in waves on this small island, nearly 100 miles off the southern tip of Taiwan. Lu’s platoonHamim, holding automatic rifles and machine guns, jumped from Black Hawk helicopters and took up positions around the airport. Chinook helicopters dropped dozens more people in a whirlwind of hot air and dust. They unloaded cans of fuel, sacks of ready-to-eat meals and cases of medical supplies, small drones and satellite communications equipment – everything they would need for a three-day stay.
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If they kept going north, they would reach Taiwan in less than an hour.
It was a military exercise. The guns had no ammunition and the javelin launcher had no missiles. But the Marines have been training for a real-world conflict, working to perfect a strategy they see as critical to fighting China in its own environment – its closest island chains.
This area should be their area of expertise. They belong to the Marine Corps’ 3rd Coast Guard Battalion, which was established two years ago as part of a sweeping redesign designed to better prepare the U.S. Marine Corps for superpower rivalry after decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Wall Street Journal flew them to Itbayat Island, a 90-minute helicopter ride from the nearest large Philippine island, and island-hopping to remote Philippine military sites from which they operated during the exercises.
In a military confrontation, these marines would move forward, as far and as fast as possible, with missiles and radars. They would spread out in small groups across islands and coastlines. Then, they would keep moving so that China’s missiles, sensors and drones could not find them.
The adversary will have to “put a lot of resources into understanding where we are and what we’re doing,” said Colonel John Lehane, commander of the 2,500-strong force based in Hawaii. “We complicate his decision-making.” In practice, it is not that simple.
Operating in remote locations that pose difficult conditions involves many problems. Some of the islands have large runways, but others only have small helipads. Remote coastal areas are not always linked by roads wide enough to carry radar systems and missile batteries. The Marines need small ships to maneuver, but they don’t have any.
In war, there will be threats everywhere, and they will make it difficult to move supplies. China has a formidable arsenal of missiles, as well as UAVs of all shapes and sizes. And it has an advantage: fighting in an area it considers its backyard, close to its navy, military bases and extensive surveillance network.
Part of the Marines’ goal is to delay China in the early stages of the fighting, and buy time for the entry of more American forces into the scene. From the front line, they will get a close-up picture of the battlespace through sensors and UAVs, and fire missiles to destroy Chinese ships or to send target data to US and allied warplanes or ships.
The forces will collect a huge “tax” from China’s intelligence network
These small, nimble units will serve as the coastal cavalry of the 21st century, explained Benjamin Jensen, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, who teaches at the US Marine Corps University. “The ideal case is when these flexible forces Flowing up and down the first chain of islands, then they keep forcing the [סין] to look for you,” he said, referring to the territory stretching between Japan and Taiwan, the northern Philippines and the South China Sea. This would take a huge “tax” on China’s intelligence network, he said.
“Any sensor that China deploys to look for a Marine Corps coastal force is a sensor that is not looking for another target,” Jensen said. “We want them to go on false chases.” To do this, these Marines have to quarter some circles. Travel without much gear, but still be deadly. Deploy food, fuel and missiles across vast island chains. Gather quantities of information about enemy movements without giving away their own. And to do all this close to China, where turning on a radio or radar is enough to make them a target.
Over the past two years, the 3rd Marine Coastal Battalion trained in the Hawaiian Islands, conducted a combat simulation in California and traveled to the Philippines four times. They practice tactics that will allow them to communicate with each other but remain hidden, for example by creating a lot of noise in the electromagnetic spectrum to confuse enemy forces, or to draw attention to different aspects of the formation.
Server racks are being replaced with equipment the size of laptops, and 3D printers are producing spare parts for repairs. “We are constantly refining the balance between the ease of the equipment that can be taken there, to reduce the logistical burden, and its ability to adapt to combat and be reliable,” Lehan said.
“There is no substitute for placing a peacekeeper in the field so that he can inspect it”
During the most recent exercises, held in late April and early May, several small teams flew to three tiny islands scattered across the strategic Luzon Strait. Their presence signaled that the island-warrior marines were going out with their allies to the places from where they might, one day, fight Chinese forces.
“We do assessments of the islands all the time,” said Lt. Col. Mark Edgar, who helped oversee the exercises. “Evaluating everything, from these runways, through the port to the beach, and the ways in which they can be used.” They tracked the amounts of fuel they burned. They landed helicopters on fields, or “improvised landing sites”. They purified stream water using a portable system.
For three days in Itbeit, home to 3,000 civilians, the Marines camped in an abandoned building near the airstrip. They sent patrols to the local town, which would be a potential source of food and water in a crisis, and to the ports. They measured roads and bridges to figure out what vehicles they could bring, and went all the way to the north of the island, facing Taiwan, for close-up observations.
Another team continued to Mavulis, a tiny area on the northern border of the Philippines, just 88 miles from Taiwan. They attached themselves to the small patrol unit of the Philippine Army – where no civilians live – and went fishing with them. In planning for the trip they learned they could not land Bel-Boeing V-22 Ospreys on the island. On patrols, they discovered that mountain paths, which on satellite images appeared to be walkable, were actually not.
“There’s no substitute for putting a pilot in the field to check it out,” Edgar said. “We learned the most from what we call a physical familiarization tour: that it’s just being there, seeing it, photographing it, understanding it.”
They also learn what they really need, but don’t have: ships to transport the Marines and their equipment between islands, or from one point on the coast to another. Without them, the Marines are limited by rugged terrain, small bridges and narrow roads. They also depend on helicopters, which are more visible and carry smaller payloads. Plans for the production of the ships are delayed, and construction has not yet begun.
The “defense bubble” will make it difficult to supply the missiles
The coastal battalions face two problems, said Mark Kensian, a former colonel in the Marine Corps. First, it will be difficult to renew the supply of missiles in places with difficult terrain conditions inside China’s “defense bubble” during combat. Kansian, who last year ran a war game involving island-warrior marines, said the risk was that after a few effective strikes, the missiles would run out.
The second obstacle he noted was access. Manila would likely welcome the marines if a battle breaks out in the South China Sea, where it faces direct threats from Beijing. But the certainty that it will do the same to help the US repel a Chinese attack on Taiwan is much smaller.
The Marines have two shore battalions, one in Hawaii and one in Okinawa, Japan. A third battalion is on standby. Kensian explained that the Marines would be most effective if they were already in position when hostilities broke out. A battalion based in Japan would have an advantage because its troops would be able to move along the Ryukyu Islands, which lie southwest of Taiwan. The Marines from Hawaii may be forced in by combat.
This battalion, based in Japan, spends more time in the Philippines. They arrived in April for exercises, called Balikatan, which recently concluded, and will remain there until June, when they will take part in another set of exercises. Many of them will accumulate up to five months in the Philippines out of the last 14 months. This makes it more likely that they will be around if a crisis breaks out.
Keep your foot in the door so it doesn’t close to the forces
The alliance between Manila and Washington is stronger than it has been in recent decades. The U.S. has no bases in the country, but it has an agreement that gives it access to Philippine military sites to upgrade facilities there. Last year, Washington signed an agreement that would expand that access to four more sites, for a total of nine.
If China advances an invasion of Taiwan, the US forces will want to move some US warplanes to these sites. The idea would be to spread American planes over an array of bases and even civilian airports in the region, to make it difficult for China to target them and provide the US with different ways to attack, said Becca Wasser, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, which manages war games.
In the meantime, Marine coastal battalions will move to try to contain the Chinese fleet inside the first island chain, Wasser said. That is, they must prevent the Chinese from moving outside the first chain of islands and threaten American forces attacking from behind. The Marines’ purpose will also be to counter China’s “denial of access” strategy, which aims to lock down the region so that it is too dangerous for the US to approach Taiwan.
“We’re keeping our foot in the door, so it can’t be closed to the rest of the joint force, and that could put us at risk,” said Lt. Col. James Arnold, who leads the 3rd Marine Corps Air Combat Command. “That’s why we work daily on tactics that will allow us to do this in an effective and survivable way.”