The reorganization of the crisis management organization is a reaction to past crises. The consultation ends after the summer holidays. There will then be an opportunity to make improvements.
Finland has recently allowed pushbacks – albeit under strict conditions, but against the spirit of the Geneva Refugee Convention. The border police are allowed to use force to push back migrants sent across the border by the Russian authorities if necessary. The government in Helsinki is forced to use a method that is controversial under international law to fend off the Kremlin’s hybrid attacks.
Everything becomes a weapon in this ambiguous war: energy, food, and even people who dream of a better life in Europe. Russia and other authoritarian states are trying to deliberately trigger crises. The enemy, Western societies, are supposed to wear themselves out – for example, with the consequences of a misguided energy policy or in dealing with irregular migration.
Switzerland got a taste of this in the first months of 2022. The pandemic was just waning when Russia invaded Ukraine. Thousands of Ukrainians sought refuge in Switzerland. Cheap gas was not available. In addition to the health crisis, there was a threat of an energy shortage. Several crises threatened at the same time. The administration in Bern was alarmed by the specter of the polycrisis.
Above all, lessons from the Corona pandemic
The pandemic had already pushed the Swiss system to its structural limits. To date, not all of the damage has been repaired – neither socially nor financially. The Federal Council therefore wants to reorganize its crisis organization. This May, it sent the ordinance out for consultation, which regulates the details. The fundamental decision was made a year ago.
The heart of the renewed crisis management are three new staff organizations with different tasks:
- Political-Strategic Staff (PSK): This body is intended to develop options for action for the Federal Council and prepare decisions. The PSK consists of the general secretaries of the departments, the two vice chancellors, the State Secretary for Economic Affairs, the SECO and the directors of the financial administration and the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ). The focus is obviously on the economic and financial consequences of any measures. The PSK is appointed by the Federal Council.
- Operational Crisis Team (OPK): In order to “collect” the information for the decision-making basis, as the ordinance states, the SPK can call on a kind of auxiliary staff. The OPK’s task also includes “in particular” to work out “the constitutional requirements for the restrictions of basic rights”. This is why the FOJ sits on this staff, as do the relevant departments, the cantons and the “representatives of third parties”. This means science or associations. The “leading” department takes over the management.
- Permanent core rod: This element is intended to ensure that the Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOC) and the Federal Chancellery (BK) are prepared for crises even in normal situations. The responsibilities are meticulously listed in the ordinance – presumably so that this core staff cannot aggregate too much influence. An important task is the exercises with all actors in the Swiss security network.
The reorganization is primarily a response to the lessons learned from the pandemic, but the experiences from the hectic months at the beginning of 2022 were also apparently taken into account.
In the aftermath of the Corona crisis, the Federal Chancellery, Parliament and the cantons recognised similar deficits in crisis management, including “silo thinking” and “departmentalism” – in other words: the departments lacked a sense of the bigger picture. The focus of the considerations was the pandemic, other aspects of the crisis were only recognised and taken into account later.
The “silo mentality” is cemented
Already at the beginning of the pandemic, the Federal Council and the Federal Chancellery failed to properly use the instruments that were available. For example, the Federal Staff for Civil Protection (BST B) was not deployed as a crisis organization that could have coordinated and structured the staff work across the departments. The Federal Council’s Corona crisis team was convened too late and was dissolved again after the first wave in early summer 2020.
The failure to anticipate the second wave in the autumn of the same year was particularly serious. The federal government and the cantons blamed each other for the failure to take preventive measures. The then President of the Confederation, Simonetta Sommaruga, described the sensitivities as a “storm”. The centralists in the administration and on the centre-left pointed to federalism to distract from their own mistakes.
A complex structure was ultimately built around the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) that was exclusively geared towards the pandemic. The barely understandable organizational chart symbolized the crisis of Swiss crisis management. The instruments that had been defined before the pandemic were pushed aside. The fact that the permanent core staff that ensures continuity made it into the ordinance is progress.
But instead of positioning this body as the nucleus for the growth of a crisis organization, this core staff is the third of three elements. The individual departments are obviously afraid for their power. The political-strategic staff with the operational staff as an appendage cements the influence of the general secretaries in a crisis situation. The core staff is positioned outside the line as an instrument of leadership support.
This means that it is at risk of suffering a similar fate to the BST B, whose tasks were clearly regulated by law and ordinance and went beyond the competences of the future core staff: in the event of a crisis, the crisis professionals are at risk of being marginalized by the strong women and men in the departments. This is consistent with the fact that, depending on the type of crisis, a different Federal Council member and his team take the “lead” role. The expression from Bernese civil service slang has made it into the ordinance, and silo thinking is a nod.
Challenges in the Alpine region
Obviously, even in an extraordinary situation, everyday business should continue as undisturbed as possible. But crises do not adhere to the working hours of federal employees or their organizational charts. At the beginning, a crisis may have a clear focus: the coronavirus first affected the health care system and thus the department of the then Federal Councilor Alain Berset. But the Foreign Affairs, Finance and Economic Affairs Departments quickly had to get involved in crisis management.
In the end, even the pandemic was a polycrisis. The coronavirus triggered a crisis in aviation, a crisis in the free movement of people and a crisis for club operators, who have not yet fully recovered because the restrictions changed the going-out habits of an entire generation. When one department is “in charge”, the view is narrowed – and the other departments can shirk their responsibility. What does the infrastructure department care about club operators? Polycrises require an overall view.
By reorganizing crisis management, the Federal Council is missing the opportunity to learn from the cantons. The cantonal management bodies are (mostly) well-coordinated teams that already maintain their networks in normal situations. Similarly lean structures are also proving their worth in the municipalities. This is one of the reasons why the cantons of Graubünden and Valais were able to respond quickly and efficiently to the storm damage this summer.
The Babs warned in a report in autumn 2021 of an increase in such events. Climate change could lead to a whole series of crises and subsequent crises; the Alpine region is a particularly fragile ecosystem and at the same time a central hub for the European economy. If rockfalls interrupt transport routes or sweep away high-voltage power lines, this could result in supply bottlenecks or a shortage of electricity for the whole of Europe.
That is why the Federal Council, at its last meeting before the summer holidays, dealt with a “report on the ability to deal with climate-related natural hazards”. However, the analysis from the Babs does not look at the consequences of climate change in isolation, but links natural hazards with technological and social issues. From this holistic perspective, 15 areas of action with potential for improvement are identified.
Task force “hybrid war”?
The focus is on the situation network in order to optimize cooperation between the federal government and the cantons. The aim is to be able to better anticipate possible changes with a uniform situation picture. The Babs also recommends investing in joint exercises: joint training is intended to strengthen leadership and coordination skills. The analysis also identifies gaps in civil-military cooperation, particularly with regard to a further escalation of the geopolitical situation.
The Babs suggests investigating the interaction between the army, civil protection and the cantons in an “armed conflict with elements of hybrid conflict management”. In a war in which everything becomes a weapon, the civilian authorities and those responsible for the military should coordinate better in planning and command during operations. The dual functions are explicitly mentioned: key civilian figures are often also officers in key positions. The next project at the Babs will look at the effects of war on civil protection.
However, the new federal crisis management ordinance completely ignores the possibility of an escalating, hybrid war. The army is not even mentioned. What would happen if the Federal Assembly had to elect a general? What role would the commander-in-chief of the army play in the structure between the Federal Council and all the different staffs? Henri Guisan, the general in World War II, still embodies Switzerland’s resilience in an existential crisis.
The cantons and parties have until the beginning of September to submit proposals for improving the ordinance. In addition, a task force could be formed under the leadership of the new State Secretariat for Security (Sepos) to deal with the challenges of hybrid warfare – including crisis management. There is not much time left for preparation.
The first waves of attacks have already reached Switzerland. The Kremlin’s disinformation is aimed at the discussion about neutrality, cyber attacks are keeping the authorities and companies on their toes, and the next wave of refugees from the Russian-dominated Sahel is only a matter of time. Alternative options to pushbacks must be examined before the crisis. But the federal government’s crisis organization is inadequately set up for this – even after the reorganization.