Moscow’s influence in Africa seemed to be growing ever more. But doubts are slowly emerging.
They probably feared in Moscow that such images from Africa would appear on social media at some point: corpses of white men in the desert sand, Russian fighters still alive who were forced by Malian rebels to say “No to Russia” into cameras, vehicle debris, blood.
At the end of July, Russia suffered its greatest defeat on the African continent in recent years. Probably over 80 fighters from the Wagner Group, Russia’s former vanguard in Africa, were killed by separatist Tuareg rebels in a battle near the town of Tinzaouaten in northern Mali. Afterwards, a spokesman for the Ukrainian secret service boasted that the rebels had been given the “necessary information” for the fight. The evidence that Ukraine had actually played a role in the Russian defeat in the desert was scant. But the impression was more that Russia had been hit on a continent where it had seemed unstoppable until recently.
In recent years, Russia has built up a sphere of influence on the African continent that stretches almost from the Atlantic in the west to the Red Sea in the east. The heart of the region is the Sahel, a belt of large landlocked states beneath the Sahara. Jihadist groups have seized huge swathes of land there from the control of central governments over the past decade. The military then overthrew the civilian governments, accusing them of being incapable of restoring security. The new juntas expelled French and American soldiers from the country – and brought in Russian fighters and instructors in their place. This was the case first in Mali, later followed by Burkina Faso and Niger.
But now the question is what will happen next with the Russian advance in Africa. The Western troops are gone, but the Russian fighters are involved as partners of the national armies in some of the most complicated and bloody conflicts in the world. Was the Russian defeat at Tinzaouaten an isolated incident – or the beginning of greater difficulties? Can Russia expand its influence even further – or have its limits been reached?
The founding of the Afrika Korps
Whether Russia can continue to operate successfully in Africa depends not least on a force that dared to rebel against Moscow last year. In June 2023, the Wagner group under its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin mutinied because it felt abandoned by the Russian defense apparatus in Ukraine. Two months later, Prigozhin died in a plane crash allegedly orchestrated by the Russian secret service.
The military company Wagner had been Moscow’s most important tool in Africa until the mutiny. Prigozhin’s people installed themselves in the countries that came under Russia’s sights. In the Central African Republic, for example, which became Russia’s laboratory in Africa, Wagner fighters helped to push back rebels and protect the president from 2018. At the same time, Wagner built a business empire in the country; the group traded in wood, gold and diamonds, and even brewed beer.
After the mutiny and Prigozhin’s death, the Russian government tried to bring the Wagner group in Africa under its control. It set up the “Africa Corps” to serve as a new umbrella for Russian activities on the continent and is under the direct control of the Ministry of Defense. Sources close to the Kremlin claimed that the Africa Corps could grow to as many as 40,000 soldiers.
One year after Prigozhin’s death, it is clear that Wagner still exists. But the way the troupe has changed in Africa says a lot about Russia’s influence on the continent. It is driven by opportunism, and much of it is improvisation.
The secret service GRU now controls Wagner
Moscow seems to have shown a great deal of tolerance towards Wagner so far. Wagner fighters still wear their uniforms, recruits are being made for Wagner on Telegram channels, and in November 2023 fighters raised the Wagner flag after capturing the city of Kidal in Mali. Many Wagner commanders in Africa are also apparently still in office.
But the Kremlin has actually taken control of the African activities that were once entrusted to Wagner. Representatives of the GRU military intelligence service have been sent to the African partner states to monitor Russian activities. In addition, new Russian actors have emerged within the framework of the Africa Corps. In Burkina Faso, for example, several dozen members of a paramilitary group called “Bear” arrived this year. It seems that the Kremlin wants to prevent a single group from having too much power, as Wagner once did.
But regardless of whether the Russian military now operates as the Africa Corps, as Wagner, or under some other label, one thing is clear: unlike before, when the Kremlin denied having any connection with the Wagner group, the Russian government is now directly responsible for activities on the African continent. This also means that Moscow is directly responsible to its African partners and that the risks have increased.
Russian fighters massacre civilians
Russia has become involved with military governments in the Sahel that are weak and in constant danger of being removed by another coup. The conflicts in the region cannot be won with military force. They stem from large sections of the population feeling abandoned by the central state, and they take place in vast areas where rebels can disappear or blend in with the civilian population.
The Russian fighters are still trying to win militarily, with extreme violence. There are reports from Mali that Wagner soldiers, together with the Malian army, have massacred hundreds of civilians and that they have put the heads of killed villagers on stakes as a deterrent. The number of civilian casualties has risen sharply since the arrival of Wagner soldiers in Mali in late 2021, with over a thousand every year.
The Russian soldiers have managed to drive the jihadist groups out of some areas, such as central Mali. But in many places they are making no progress.
Still a popular man in Mali: Two years ago, Malians demonstrated for Russian President Vladimir Putin.
It is likely that the situation in the Sahel will continue to escalate – not despite, but because of the Russian presence. In Burkina Faso and Niger, only around a hundred Russian instructors have trained the national armies. If Russia sends more soldiers to the two countries to fight alongside armies, the situation is likely to worsen as in Mali. And the danger is growing that Russian losses like those in Tinzaouaten will pile up.
Russia has entered into unwinnable wars in the Sahel. The question is how long the Kremlin’s patience will last if the number of Russians killed increases. The question is also how long the relationship with the military juntas will remain harmonious if the Russian fighters do not succeed in improving the security situation.
Economically, Russia is a dwarf in Africa
It also shows how limited the offer that Russia makes to its African partners is. Russia has little to offer other than weapons and fighters. Its trade volume with the African continent is only 5 percent of European-African trade. Russian investments account for less than 1 percent of foreign investments in Africa.
Some Russian partners in Africa seem to have realized that Russia’s involvement has its limits. The Central African Republic, for example, which in recent years has come closest to a Russian client state in Africa, has increasingly sought contact with the West in recent months. President Faustin-Archange Touadéra has met twice with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron. Macron promised new French aid funds. There were also rumors that the Central African government was interested in bringing the American mercenary company Bancroft into the country.
It is conceivable that other African governments that have allied themselves with Moscow in recent years will also increasingly seek contact with other partners. And for all those who are not threatened by rebels, China or the wealthy United Arab Emirates are more interesting partners than Russia anyway.
The Chad Trophy
All this means that Russia’s influence in Africa does indeed have limits – and has often been overestimated in recent years. But at the same time, new opportunities are opening up for Moscow in Africa. In Niger, for example, which was considered the West’s closest ally in the Sahel until a military coup last year. Niger is an important transit country for African migrants on their way to North Africa. European governments fear that Moscow could try to drive migration northwards.
Niger’s neighbouring country Chad, where French and American soldiers are still stationed, could also be another gateway for Moscow. The government there has sent out pro-Russian signals in recent months. President Mahamat Déby travelled to Moscow in January, and in June Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov flew to Chad for a return visit. Chad would be a great trophy for Russia because it would then have a huge, contiguous sphere of influence on NATO’s southern flank.
And that is why Russia will not withdraw from Africa any time soon – as it did after the end of the Cold War. The continent has become too important for Moscow. And despite growing risks, it still offers many opportunities to feed Russia’s dreams of becoming a great power.