Terrorism in Europe. The Tik-Tok Generation, Peter R. Neumann

Mr. Neumann, in your book you describe a new type of violent criminal, namely Tiktok terrorists. What is new about that?

For one thing, these perpetrators are extremely young. Since October 2023, I have recorded all of the almost 60 people arrested on suspicion of terrorism in Western Europe. Two-thirds of them are teenagers, i.e. between 13 and 19 years old. This is new. Ten years ago, this age group was an exception; now it is the rule. In addition, these suspects are radicalized exclusively or mainly online. The Internet already played a major role ten years ago. But there was also at least one person “offline”, a radical preacher, for example, who gave the final impetus to the crime. The new pattern is also evident in Switzerland: think of the nine arrests of teenagers over the past few months, for example in Schaffhausen and Thurgau at Easter. Or the perpetrator who stabbed an Orthodox Jew in the street in Zurich in March.

How should we imagine this self-radicalization?

It starts on the big platforms like Tiktok or Instagram, which appeal to very young people and are heavily algorithmically operated. If you click three times on a video that has something to do with Palestine, for example, you will almost only see corresponding content. And because these platforms have a hard time controlling their content, it is easy for users to consume jihadist and Islamist propaganda over and over again. Those affected get caught in a spiral that sooner or later leads to them ending up in a closed group.

For example, on Telegram. There they exchange encrypted messages with others who have similar interests. They send each other videos of attacks and get excited by the violence depicted. The focus is almost always on violent fantasies, with ideology playing a secondary role. At some point, someone asks the question: Why don’t we do something like that? That’s what happened with the teenagers from Schaffhausen and Thurgau, who networked with German peers. The Telegram group, which was initially used to exchange videos, eventually became an instrument for planning specific attacks.

 

What social and psychological profile do these young people have?

You have to be careful because the number of cases is small. Many have a migration background, but are not immigrants themselves, but are second or third generation residents. But there are also young people without a migration background. And there are certainly a lot of young people with previous mental health problems. But as I said, we don’t yet have a clear pattern.

This perpetrator profile actually corresponds more to that of (apolitical) mass murderers – especially since jihadist ideology plays a subordinate role?

Yes. In general, perpetrators who become radicalized on the Internet often have a history of mental illness. Jihadist ideology gives them an opportunity to live out their violent fantasies. This connection between illness and violent acts also exists in right-wing terrorism. As I said, it is less about ideological armament than about radicalization leading to the act.

Can we even speak of terrorists?

That is a legitimate question. For terrorists, violence is in the service of a political goal. These individual perpetrators have only fragmentary political or ideological ideas. At the heart of the matter is hatred. Hatred of society, hatred of others. Unfortunately, the discussion about the motives of violent perpetrators is usually politicized. The right-wing camp pathologizes right-wing terrorism as the act of sick people. But if the perpetrator is a Muslim, then the reflexive conclusion is that it is jihadist terrorism with political intent. And many leftists argue exactly the opposite. It is important to look closely: a paranoid-schizophrenic violent perpetrator cannot, by definition, be a terrorist.

And yet, even after such acts of violence, IS virtually takes responsibility for them and tries to take credit for them?

That is the strategy of IS. It says: We are not currently in a position to send our “soldiers” to Europe like we did in 2014 and 2015. But we call out to our sympathizers: You too can become a fighter. You don’t even need to come to Syria or join the organization. It is enough if you record a video and declare your allegiance to IS before you take action. We will then declare your allegiance to you, and you will be a soldier or even a martyr. This is how IS increases its potential. Another strategy is for IS officials to actively search for potential “recruits” on the Internet and then act as mentors. Incidentally, the father of a 15-year-old from Düsseldorf who initiated the terrorist group from Baden-Württemberg, Schaffhausen and Thurgau is also suspected of being a mentor – the trial will show whether this is true.

After October 7 and the start of the Gaza war, Europol warned of an increase in attacks by “lone wolves,” i.e. precisely the individual perpetrators and small groups we are talking about. Can we say anything definitive about this yet?

I think so. Since October 7 last year, we have had 6 small Islamist attacks and 21 attempted attacks in Western Europe. If we compare that with 2022, that’s a fourfold increase. This is not the big wave because there was no major attack. If the planned attack on the Taylor Swift concert in Vienna had taken place – and there had been many deaths – then we would be talking differently now. I believe that there is enough evidence that something bigger is looming. The “impacts”, if you will, are becoming more frequent and they are getting closer. But we have it in our hands to avert a new wave if we do the right thing. Previous waves were also looming.

The Syrian conflict began in 2011 – and the major attacks in Europe only came in 2014, 2015 and 2016. I think October 7 and the Gaza war triggered a lot. It caused a huge motivational boost that activated many people. We have to use the time until they are ready to strike. For example, to adapt law enforcement and prevention strategies to very young perpetrators. Or to strengthen intelligence capabilities in virtual space.

But in the large-scale attacks you warn about, the perpetrators are not Tiktok terrorists . . .

No, there are also new networks. For a few years now, IS-K, an offshoot from Afghanistan, has been more active again. It has recruited heavily in Central Asia, in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and so on. These perpetrators are responsible for the attack on a concert hall in Moscow in March, in which 143 people died, or for the attack on a Catholic church in Istanbul in January, in which one man was killed, as well as other attacks in Iran. In Western Europe, IS-K has attempted at least half a dozen attacks that were foiled. These two developments – the resurgent professionals of IS-K on the one hand and the teenage terrorists from the West on the other – are largely happening independently of each other.

One last question about the connection between Islam and violence. Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy, two leading French researchers, have opposing views. Kepel sees terrorism as the result of a religion that is producing increasingly radical variants and representatives. For Roy, on the other hand, it is about the willingness of marginalized people to use violence, who superficially give themselves the appearance of being religious. Violence is an end in itself. Where do you stand?

The positions are – as is often the case in French debates – very absolute. Nevertheless, this debate has brought to light many new insights. But anyone who seriously studies radicalization can see that both elements play a role. In every generation, young people have a fundamental revolutionary energy that can turn in very different directions. To the left, to the right, or even to religious fanaticism. In that respect, I agree with Roy. But Kepel rightly points out that theology and ideology are also at play. That is why there is much more to this debate. What does it mean to be a Muslim in Europe? Where is the place of Islam in our societies, and how can it be integrated? Many people avoid this debate, but that is a mistake. Because with every attack, this discussion becomes more difficult and the polarization in our society becomes stronger. That is precisely the aim of terrorism. It wants to push Muslims to the margins of our society so that they become receptive to the idea of ​​a religious war. We must prevent that.

In September, Peter R. Neumann’s book The Return of Terror: How Jihadism Challenges Us will be published by Rowohlt-Verlag.