The war has gained new momentum with the Ukrainian offensive at Kursk. The Russian army is trying to limit the advance, but the Kremlin has lost control of the border region and its critical infrastructure for the time being.
The Russian army is still on the attack in Donbass. West of Donetsk, three regiments are advancing side by side in a narrow strip just ten kilometers wide towards the railway junction of Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian troops have to vacate positions almost daily in order not to lose men and material senselessly, but have so far been able to prevent a breakthrough.
It is an advance at crawling speed. The Russian occupiers are using several times more force than they currently have at their disposal on the new front in the Kursk region. There, the Ukrainian army seized the initiative and advanced into Russian territory on August 6. At first, the Russian troops were hardly able to counter the offensive. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are only advancing slowly.
The element of surprise worked. The Kremlin is using its propaganda channels to try not to raise high expectations of a quick, energetic counterattack. Russia is on the defensive on its own territory. The Ukrainian troops are tactically in a much better position than the Russian forces that stand in their way. The meandering Seim River forms a natural border of the contested area.
In the meantime, the Russian army was able to move strong forces to the Kursk front: at least twelve motorized rifle regiments and four brigades. A tank division also approached from the east. But the balance of power is not sufficient to encircle the Ukrainian combat units and retaliate decisively. In addition, the Russian forces can hardly move. The Ukrainians are sealing off the battlefield, particularly in the west.
In recent weeks, the Ukrainian Air Force has succeeded in destroying the main crossings over the Seim from the air. The motorized rifle regiments that have already crossed the river are largely cut off from supplies. Additional forces can hardly flow in. In addition, the Ukrainian artillery is firing on all attempts by the enemy to build pontoon bridges.
A video from August 21 shows a double hit with cluster munitions destroying an emergency crossing over the Seim. The Ukrainian side continues to have a superior sensor-to-shooter loop, as it is called in NATO language: the extremely short period of time from the detection of a possible target to the decision to attack it to the use of weapons is one of the advantages of the Ukrainians on the battlefield.
⚡️🇺🇦M142 HIMARS strikes with GMLRS missiles and ATACMS cluster missiles on 🇷🇺Russian pontoon crossings in the Kursk region pic.twitter.com/8iCv1bsVYS
— 🪖MilitaryNewsUA🇺🇦 (@front_ukrainian) August 21, 2024
From Russia’s perspective, the most dangerous possibility is that the units will be encircled east and south of the Seim. Ukraine could capture a large number of enemy soldiers and thus significantly improve its own position in negotiations with the Kremlin. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has already hinted at this possibility in a speech. He spoke of an “exchange fund”, which sounds somewhat cynical.
In general, the occupied territory across the border also seems to be a collateral for an exchange of land for land for Ukraine. The number of square kilometers is one thing, but the question also arises as to what the area’s actual value is. The importance of the railway lines that run along the Ukrainian border towards Belgorod is immediately apparent. They are part of the supply network of the Russian troops in the Donbass.
There are other critical infrastructures along the Seim, some of which are now under Kyiv’s control:
Of particular importance is the gas pipeline with the catchy name Bratstvo (Brotherhood); it runs through the Ukrainian-occupied territory. The last measuring station before the border is located in the town of Sudzha. The supplier Gazprom checks the quantity and quality there once again before the gas flows further west. This data is relevant so that the companies involved can settle accounts with each other.
Sudzha is a critical point for Russian gas exports. The Kremlin supplies its remaining customers in the EU, including Hungary, Slovakia and Austria, via the Bratstwo pipeline. Although the fighting has damaged the measuring station, the gas is still flowing, Gazprom says – and regrets that the transfer via the second large pipeline, with the equally Soviet-sounding name Soyuz (Union), is not possible for reasons of “force power”.
In May 2022, Kyiv suspended the operation of the Soyuz pipeline because Russian invading troops had taken possession of the central compression station in Novopskov during their advance in eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian operating company could no longer independently control the amount of gas flowing through the pipeline. In addition, armed groups siphoned off gas. Without Soyuz, Gazprom’s delivery capacity to Europe fell by a third.
Control over critical infrastructure is not an insignificant element in Russia’s war against Ukraine. With the Kursk offensive, Kiev has succeeded in exposing Moscow in this area too: the gas business seems to be so important to the Kremlin that Gazprom would rather leave the measuring devices in Sudzha to the Ukrainians than shut down the pipeline. Russia is obviously dependent on its last customers in the West.
One of the largest iron ore areas in Europe is also within easy reach – the result of this is the Kursk magnetic anomaly, a rare natural phenomenon: there is so much iron in the ground that the compass needle does not point north. However, the largest mines are not owned by the Ukrainian army. The nuclear power plant, which lies west of Kursk on the right bank of the Seim, is also still in Russian hands.
In addition to this war of infrastructure, the Kursk offensive has primarily affected the military capabilities of the Ukrainian army. Its commander-in-chief, General Olexander Sirski, has succeeded in seizing the initiative. A situation that had previously been rather static has begun to change: while parts of the Ukrainian units have found new courage, the enemy is forced to regroup its forces.
Sirski now has several options to capitalize on the new momentum. Three of them deserve a closer discussion:
- Counterattack Kharkiv: The occupied area in the Kursk region is about the same size as the area that Russian troops were able to occupy during their offensive east of Kharkiv last May. The buffer zone was intended to better protect the border areas from attacks by volunteer units. All other options – in particular a deception for a larger offensive – were unsuccessful. Ukraine was able to stop the advance with relatively weak forces. A surprise counter-offensive would have a good chance of success if the Russian army moved forces from the Kharkiv region towards Kursk. In the overall context, however, recapturing the area would have relatively little value.
- Pincer attack Pokrovsk: The Russian army is currently focusing on its offensive west of Donetsk. The target of the attack, the railway junction of Pokrovsk, appears to be heavily fortified, with firing positions encased in reinforced concrete, trenches and prepared barriers. To really occupy the small town, the invading troops would have to spend even more time and effort than in Bakhmut and Avdiivka. In contrast, the Ukrainian army has the opportunity to launch a pincer attack on the enemy’s relatively narrow offensive strip. To at least isolate the front-line units, no more than three tank brigades are needed. Whether these forces are available, however, cannot be determined from the available data.
- Grossoffensive Cherson: Another coup by Sirski would be a crossing operation in the Dnipro bend. The bottom of the former reservoir, which drained away after the Kakhovka dam was blown up, dried out over the summer. On the other side of the basin, the Russian occupiers have not erected any barriers: the Surovikin Line has a gap. In principle, the Ukrainian army has enough mobile bridges and pontoons to enable a larger task force to cross the branched branches of the Dnipro. However, such an operation would have to be carried out practically out of nowhere and very quickly in order not to expose the troops to Russian fire. However, the Ukrainians have a clear advantage with the F-16 jets: they can gain air superiority for a limited time and space and thus protect the crossing operation from Russian attacks with fighter planes and helicopters. Even with this variant, however, the question arises as to where the necessary ground troops will come from.
A pessimistic possibility is also being discussed: Sirski may have used too many forces for the Kursk offensive and is now losing the battle at Pokrovsk. The Russian troops are ten kilometers from the city. Despite favorable conditions, another battle in the built-up area would be a heavy burden in the war of attrition that Russia is forcing on Ukraine. While the Kremlin has few scruples about losses, for Kiev every human life counts.
In fact, the Ukrainian army is also struggling with personnel shortages. The units on the Donbass front were not caught up in the Kursk euphoria, or so the Western media have reported. It is therefore difficult to imagine a further deployment of Ukrainian offensive forces. But the rotation system with a third of the troops in action, a third behind the front and a third on vacation allows Sirski to maneuver his combat brigades unnoticed.
Ukraine still has operational momentum – and is able to hold its own in the tragic competition for attention with the Middle East war. Instead of waiting for the American elections, Kiev is trying to create facts. Contrary to what strategists in Washington feared, the Kremlin has so far reacted remarkably passively to the Kursk offensive. Based on this logic, another coup by Sirski would have to follow.
Collaboration: Seda Motie, Jessica Eberhart