Out of consideration for its geopolitical interests in Eurasia, Delhi is holding back on criticism of Moscow. But it is now more clearly on the side of the West
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself described his visit to Kyiv on August 23 as “historic”. And rightly so. Modi was not only the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Ukraine since the country regained its sovereignty with the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991.
His trip to the country, which has been the target of a brutal war of aggression and conquest by Russia for over two and a half years, also sent a clear message.
Together with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Modi visited a memorial site for Ukrainian children killed in the war and laid a doll there. As they watched a video about the horrors of war, the Indian Prime Minister put his arm around the Ukrainian president’s shoulders.
With his visit, Modi is putting the weight of the rising Asian superpower India behind Ukraine’s existence as a free, sovereign state. In doing so, he follows in the footsteps of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who already visited Kyiv in March 2023.
True, just six weeks earlier, Modi had visited Moscow, where he hugged Vladimir Putin. But that was a routine visit between traditional partners. The visit to Kyiv, on the other hand, signals something new.
India’s geo-strategy in transition
The Russian-Indian partnership goes back to the Cold War. Over decades, non-aligned India learned to value Russia as a reliable friend and as a supplier of advanced weapons. Even today, Moscow remains important to Delhi: as a counterweight to China on the Eurasian continent.
India’s geopolitical nightmare continues to be the close cooperation between the three nuclear powers Pakistan, China and Russia. Delhi views the closer cooperation between Russia and China with concern. It is of great importance for India to sit together with both powers in the important multilateral formats: the BRICS, the club of more or less rising powers, and the SCO, a regional association of Eurasian countries.
At the same time, however, the West is becoming increasingly important for India’s geopolitical strategy, which focuses on managing China’s rise. Ever since the renewed outbreak of the border conflict with China in May 2020, India has seen China as an acute threat to its security and is relying on the United States to contain Beijing’s claim to power.
A “world of rivalry without rules” is looming, Modi said in his speech to the US Congress in June 2023, and he called for Indian-American cooperation as an antidote. Both India and America are united in their vision of a “free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific” that must be “free from domination.”
In his speech, Modi called the Quad, the format in which the US, India, Japan and Australia are increasingly cooperating on security issues and which is being opposed by China, a “force for good”.
Turning to the West
At the same time, relations with Russia are weakening, even if Delhi does not want to say so openly. India has been trying for years to reduce its dependence on Russian military goods by purchasing weapons from the USA, France and Israel. One reason for this is that Russian weapons no longer offer a technological advantage over those of arch-rival China.
America, on the other hand, offers India access to modern high technology and, even more importantly, the integration of Indian companies into the supply chains of the US defense industry. In August, India and the USA signed two agreements that are intended to deepen cooperation between the defense industries of both countries, as well as the interoperability and closer cooperation between the armed forces of both countries.
Together, India and the USA are “a formidable force that can ensure peace, prosperity and stability in the world,” said Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh at the signing of the treaties.
India is not as vocal as Japan in its support for Ukraine. Japanese Prime Minister Kishida has repeatedly drawn a comparison between Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and his formula has become well-known: “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow.” And Japan, which is already closely linked to Europe through the G-7, has supported Ukraine with 12 billion US dollars since March 2022.
Modi, on the other hand, officially maintains a position of neutrality. He neither sees himself as a mediator nor does he take a clear position on the demands of both sides.
In September 2022, however, Modi told Putin that “this is not the time for war.” This formula, which the Indian Prime Minister has repeated since then, was widely understood as a criticism of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Unlike China, India also participated in the Ukraine Peace Conference in Switzerland in June 2024.
At the same time, however, India has benefited from the fact that Russia has to offer its oil at a reduced price in view of Western sanctions; India has been buying large quantities of Russian oil since the beginning of the war. Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar regularly responds to Western critics by saying that the West also continues to buy oil from Russia. In Kiev, Jaishankar explained that India has no “political strategy” to buy Russian oil, but that the market is tight and India needs the oil.
Nevertheless, Modi’s visit to Kyiv carries a clear message. With this act, Modi implicitly opposes Putin’s claim to subject Ukraine to Moscow’s rule.
For Putin, as he explained in a historical-political essay published in July 2021, Ukraine’s state independence is a historical error that he wants to correct by force. For Modi, on the other hand, Ukraine is a respected, important European country, a valued partner of India.
Poland becomes a strategic partner
The fact that Modi visited Poland before his visit to Ukraine underscores this message. Poland is one of Ukraine’s most determined and important supporters, and it is the preferred target of Russian propaganda. From Moscow’s perspective, Warsaw is one of the main obstacles to Russia’s westward expansion.
During his visit, Modi has now concluded a “strategic partnership” with this country, along with an action plan to deepen cooperation between the two countries. Modi also spoke with the Polish Prime Minister about deeper cooperation in the area of defense and security.
It may be a coincidence that the Japanese and Indian leaders’ visits to Kyiv both coincided with visits by the Chinese leadership to Moscow. When Kishida was in Kyiv in March 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Putin in Moscow. And when Modi traveled to Kyiv now, Chinese Premier Li Qiang was in Moscow for talks with the Russian president.
China is also interested in Eastern Europe. But while Modi visited Poland and Ukraine, Xi Jinping made Hungary his East-Central European destination in May this year, following stops in France and Serbia. The contrast could not be greater: Hungary is Moscow’s best friend in the EU, while Poland is its most determined opponent.
The three most important Asian powers have very different positions on the war in Ukraine. China is on the side of Russia, whose war it is supporting on a large scale, including by supplying dual-use goods. Japan is unreservedly on the side of Ukraine and the West, also because it draws parallels with the situation in the Indo-Pacific, where another would-be hegemon – China – is also focusing on territorial expansion.
And while India does not want to clearly take sides, it is making it clear, with an arduous train journey by its no longer very young prime minister – Modi is 73 – that it supports Ukraine’s struggle for self-assertion.