Iran’s dilemma after the rocket attack on Israel – Interview

Mr. Fathollah-Nejad, what strategy is behind the Iranian missile attack on Israel?

There was immense pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran to respond to Israeli actions. High-ranking commanders of the so-called Axis of Resistance, but also of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard were killed. After the targeted killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniya, Tehran had already announced harsh retaliation – but that failed to materialize. But now Israel’s actions against Hezbollah, the killing of Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and the elimination of almost the entire leadership have been the last straw. Even in the Arab world people wondered whether Iran had abandoned Hezbollah. So Tehran had an immense credibility problem with its supporters. It had to react – also to avoid Israel from hitting even more figures inside and outside Iran in the future.

Who made the decision to launch this rocket attack?

Iran’s regional policy is determined by the Islamic Republic’s power center. This consists of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his “court” – a kind of parallel government – ​​and the Revolutionary Guards. Decisions in strategically important areas of security and foreign policy are often made in the so-called Supreme National Security Council, which includes various factions of the elite. The rocket attack against Israel was also the result of such a decision by this Security Council.

Apparently Iran’s President Pezeshkian had called for restraint. How do you view these differences of opinion?

There is a tendency in some Western media to grossly exaggerate the relevance of the Iranian president. He is not part of the Islamic Republic’s power core. Rather, it should give it a friendly face to the outside world. It is impossible to see from the outside whether there are differences of opinion within the Security Council. However, when it comes to foreign policy, there is a high degree of consensus. But of course there are also discussions. Iran is in a major strategic dilemma.

 

To what extent?

The new Iranian President Masud Pezeshkian has made it clear that he is striving for an agreement with the West so that the sanctions can be relaxed – because the economic situation in Iran is desolate. This mission is also supported by the Power Core. A military conflict with Israel would of course run counter to this. Iran therefore finds itself in a major strategic dilemma between the pursuit of understanding and its regional policy. The latter consists of supporting the Axis of Resistance, which is not just a power projection by Tehran. Iran’s regional strength also serves as a bargaining chip with the West. But after Nasrallah was eliminated, conditions changed. Iran can ill afford to lose Hezbollah militarily – and has therefore been under pressure to respond.

Did the Iranian leadership’s calculations with the rocket attack on Israel work?

Overall, I see the Iranian regime in a big mess: On the one hand, they want to show strength. On the other hand, there are immense risks involved in getting involved in a spiral that could result in a major war. Most recently it was said that Tehran had informed the USA via Qatar that it did not want the regional war to expand. At the same time, Tehran threatened to abandon its “unilateral” restraint. This shows very clearly what a predicament Tehran finds itself in. The Israelis are now expecting a much stronger reaction than after the first direct Iranian attack on Israel in April – also because the Iranian side used more modern weapons this time.

 

Now the whole world is waiting for the Israeli reaction. What targets could they attack in Iran?

I assume that there is very close coordination between Israel and the USA. Without a yellow or green light from Washington, some possible actions by Israel are unthinkable.

So no bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities? US President Biden has already ruled out support for such a strike.

Iran’s important nuclear facilities are hidden deep in the mountains and underground. So military action is difficult. You would have to use bunker-busting bombs. The question is whether this will succeed. There are different opinions – not to mention the radioactive damage that could result. I think other options are more likely: for example, shelling the Revolutionary Guards’ military installations. And the Iranian oil facilities are also under discussion. An attack on it could further weaken the Iranian economy and the regime’s main source of income.

Khamenei has already warned Israel not to react – they will then hit back even harder. But is Iran prepared for continued confrontation?

A major war entails immense risks for Iran. This concern was already noticeable in the regime after the Israeli assassination attempt on Hamas leader Haniya. It said: “We must not fall into Netanyahu’s trap and allow ourselves to be drawn into a major war.” Of course, Iran has asymmetrical opportunities to cause a lot of unrest with its allied militias in the axis of resistance. But when it comes to conventional military capabilities, Israel is far superior to the Islamic Republic. In addition, the Israeli secret services may have also massively infiltrated the Iranian power centers. The question also arises as to whether Israel also sabotaged the Revolutionary Guard’s communication devices.

Such a war would also be a financial burden.

Yes, the state coffers are emptier than expected. A prolonged war would cost a lot. Iran actually cannot afford that. And what’s more, there is no support for it among the population.

How do the Iranians view an impending major war? Do you support your regime in its actions against Israel?

There is an immense gap between state and society in Iran. It can be observed in all important pillars of Iranian politics: in the dress codes for women, but also in the hostility towards Israel and America. The vast majority of the Iranian population is hostile to the regime’s regional adventurism: to style itself as a major regional power instead of taking care of the Iranians’ domestic political problems. A major war from outside and a simultaneous uprising from within would be the regime’s nightmare scenario. In other words, if the regime’s infrastructure were to be damaged and the population took advantage of this to vent their anger, the security forces would be overstretched and would make themselves vulnerable. In such a scenario, cracks within the security apparatus cannot be ruled out.

It sounds as if the rocket attack on Israel was ultimately not in the interests of the Iranian leadership – if you think about the possible consequences.

It was a choice between plague and cholera, a risky maneuver. But the shame of these Israeli actions – the massive weakening of Hezbollah and the elimination of its leadership, especially the key figure Nasrallah – had become too great. This was truly a turning point for Iranian regional policy. They also wanted to restore deterrence against Israel. However, this can lead to an uncontrollable spiral of escalation – as I said, with great risks also for the regime. The strategic uncertainty in Tehran can be felt everywhere.

Ali Fathollah-Nejad, German-Iranian political scientist, researches Iran, the Near and Middle East, Western foreign policy and the post-unipolar world order. Among other things, he teaches international security and Middle East politics at the Hertie School in Berlin.