The organization emphasizes that the group focuses on guerrilla warfare tactics and affirms that it is also increasing its attacks in the West Bank.
The military offensive unleashed by the Israeli Army against the Gaza Strip almost a year ago, in response to the attacks carried out on October 7, 2023 by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and other Palestinian factions, has managed to “weaken” to the Islamist group, which is however far from being “eliminated”, according to a study by Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).
Thus, he has indicated that, although the Israeli authorities assure that Hamas no longer exists as a military force in the Palestinian enclave, the data he manages show that it still maintains “some operational capabilities” that allow it to continue carrying out clashes with Israeli forces in Loop.
In fact, ACLED emphasizes that the group could still maintain about half of its militiamen and adds that, although Israel estimates that the members of the armed wing died in combat at around 17,000 – out of a total of between 25,000 and 30,000 – -, “detailed reports (published by the Israeli Army) identify only 8,500 deaths among the militants.”
Thus, he explains that, while Israeli military operations have “significantly” reduced the group’s capabilities, the number of casualties suffered is unclear, especially since Israel’s reports “include militiamen from other armed groups and possibly members of Hamas who are not combatants.
Hamas has also demonstrated during the offensive its “ability to regroup” and, although the Army has established operational control of four of the five Gazan governorates during the last twelve months, the group has managed to re-emerge and continue carrying out operations in Gaza City, Northern Gaza and Khan Younis.
“This has forced the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to continue launching smaller ground raids to prevent Hamas from establishing a full presence again,” he notes, while indicating that fighting has continued with “varying intensity.” during the last few months.
Hamas’s declining military capabilities and the dismantling of “many” of its brigades have led the group to increasingly focus on guerrilla warfare tactics, primarily around explosive ambushes against the Israeli military, for which it is making use of an extensive network of tunnels in Gaza.
ACLED highlights that this network “remains functional in many areas”, which plays “a significant role” in allowing members of the armed wing of Hamas, the Ezzeldin al Qassam Brigades, to carry out operations of this type, with “levels high” rates of bomb attacks today despite the end of the most intense phase of hostilities, which took place between December and January.
“By engaging in a war of attrition, rather than directly confronting an Army with vastly superior firepower, Hamas is probably trying to improve its chances of survival,” he argues, before noting that the group has also increased over the last year their attacks in the West Bank.
INCREASED HAMAS OPERATIONS IN THE WEST BANK
In this sense, ACLED emphasizes that Hamas has increased its “armed activities” in the West Bank, which had already rebounded in 2022, following the October 7 attacks against Israel, known as ‘Al Aqsa Flood’ and which left nearly 1,200 dead and about 250 kidnapped, according to Israeli authorities.
Since then, Hamas has been involved in some 130 “violent incidents,” which is 135 percent more than in the previous twelve months and more than 13 percent of the violence by Palestinian armed groups, a figure that could be even higher, since the group does not claim responsibility for all its actions.
The report reflects that, although groups affiliated with Islamic Jihad and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade continue to carry out the majority of attacks, those carried out by Hamas have caused the most victims, including a “refinement” of their tactics over the last few months.
In this way, the document notes that Hamas has attempted “more sophisticated and complex attacks” using explosives, including a joint attempt with Islamic Jihad to carry out its first suicide bombing in nearly eight years in August, although the suspect He was neutralized before achieving it.
Just a few days later, Hamas members carried out a double, almost simultaneous car bomb attack at a gas station near the settlement of Gush Etzion and inside the settlement of Karmei Tzur, resulting in three injuries and the death of two members of Hamas. the Ezzeldín al Qassam Brigades at the hands of the security forces.
IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS
For this reason, ACLED emphasizes that Hamas, despite being militarily weakened, will continue its armed struggle against Israel and maintain “a firm ideological and political roots” in Palestine, including “greater opportunities to expand its influence” in the face of the upsurge in violence. and attacks by Jewish settlers in the West Bank, which has increased support for the armed struggle.
The Israeli offensive has left nearly 42,000 civilians dead to date, including some 16,900 children, according to the balance provided by the Gazan authorities, controlled by Hamas. Added to this number of victims are nearly 725 Palestinians killed at the hands of Israeli forces or in attacks carried out by settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
The report further highlights that, even if a ceasefire agreement is reached in Gaza, so far rejected by the Government of Israel, Israeli troops will try to maintain some type of military presence around the Netzarim corridors – ranging from the border with Israel near the town of Beeri to the coast, passing between Gaza City and Nuseirat, thereby splitting the enclave in two– and Philadelphia to “carry out future operations, similar to the way the that operates in the West Bank.
The Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, has defended this demand on numerous occasions, flatly rejected by Hamas, which demands the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops. Egypt has also been against it, especially since the Philadelphia corridor is very close to its border.
Finally, ACLED states that Hamas “no longer has the ability or desire to govern a Gaza at war,” but “retains the ability to continue fighting in a low-intensity conflict,” so “violence is expected to continue.” for the foreseeable future,” given that the group “is far from being totally eradicated.