The Ukraine war is tearing the Visegrad group apart

Over many years, Western Europeans have become accustomed to East-Central Europeans deviating from the consensus on some issues and wanting to steer the European course in a different direction. This particularly applies to the relationship with Russia and migration, where they represent a restrictive course. At the same time, the East Central Europeans had a close relationship with the USA and were skeptical about the visions of “strategic autonomy” for Europe promoted by Paris.

The expression of the unity of the East Central Europeans was the Visegrad Group founded in the 1990s – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – which regularly coordinated at its own meetings or before EU summits in Brussels.

An inspiration for the formation of the Visegrad Group came from a speech by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel in January 1990. He said at the time that the aim was to make East Central Europe a “political phenomenon” so that the region would appear to richer Western Europeans “not as a poor one or helpless failures, as “recently released prisoners”, but can make a “genuine contribution”.

And indeed, it seemed as if over the years a kind of bloc would emerge that, after the member states joined NATO and the EU, could articulate and at least occasionally enforce the region’s specific interests against the Western Europeans.

Disintegration of unity

However, today there is no sign of the unity and unity that once existed. The heads of government and ministers of the Visegrad Group only meet rarely, and efforts to reach common positions before meetings of the European Council no longer take place.

Instead, two opposing centers have emerged in the region: Poland in northern Eastern Central Europe, Hungary in southern Eastern Central Europe. This division is being driven forward by the Russian war against Ukraine.

Even before Russia’s major attack in February 2022, it became clear that Poland and Hungary had developed different relationships with Moscow. But when the Russian war of aggression and conquest became the central, dominating issue, the relationship could no longer be repaired. In addition to the geopolitical clash, there is also a political one: since the national-conservative PiS party lost the elections in Poland and the western liberal Donald Tusk became prime minister again in December 2023, the tablecloth between Poland and Hungary has been completely cut.

For Poland, the Russian attack on Ukraine was confirmation of what had always been suspected: that Russian imperialism, which has traditionally directed its covetous gaze towards Eastern and East-Central Europe, had by no means quietly fallen asleep. Moscow had recovered from the shock of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and built new strength by opening up to the West. It is now directing that strength toward the goal of regaining control of the territories it lost after the Cold War.

Russia’s war as a threat to its existence

From the outset, Poland saw the war in Ukraine as a decisive showdown that would determine the future of regional security. If Russia were to win in Ukraine, Poland is convinced that Moscow would not be far off from attacking the Baltic states or Poland. Accordingly, Warsaw supports Ukraine massively with weapons and ammunition and has taken in a significant number of Ukrainian refugees; At the same time, it became a hub for Western arms deliveries.

Poland also began to invest even more in its own armed forces; This year it has reached 4.1 percent of gross domestic product, next year it will be 4.7 percent, over 40 billion euros.

For those who rely on massive deterrence against Russia, Poland has long since become the class leader. An article recently appeared in the American foreign policy journal Foreign Affairs arguing that Poland should take the European lead on security issues because it invests massively in its own security like no other European country and because of its geographical location and its… experience can best deal with Russia.

Meanwhile, Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban developed into the opposite pole to Poland. Orban consistently tried to block or at least delay support for Ukraine at the EU level, and he also delayed approval of Sweden’s NATO membership as much as possible. Orban also traveled to Moscow and Beijing in the summer without an EU mandate, ostensibly to explore the opportunities for peace negotiations.

Slovakia largely joined Hungary after Robert Fico’s election victory in October 2023. The Czech Republic, on the other hand, like Poland, is one of Ukraine’s most determined supporters.

Separate paths

A Visegrad summit took place in Prague in February this year. At the subsequent press conference, Polish Prime Minister Tusk described the Russian president as a war criminal and stated that the only reason for this war was Russian aggression against Ukraine. Orban countered: Who was responsible for the war would be decided after the conflict.

Following the summit, Tusk visited the Czech President and former NATO general Petr Pavel, who is heavily committed to Ukraine. Orban and his Slovak counterpart Fico paid their respects to Pavel’s predecessor Milos Zeman, who is known for his proximity to Moscow.

In a speech in July, Orban said that the center of power in Europe had changed with the war in Ukraine – away from the Berlin-Paris axis, which had become “irrelevant”. The new axis connects London, Warsaw, Kiev, the Baltic countries and Scandinavia.

Indeed, what brings these countries in the north and northeast of Europe together is their strong determination to support Ukraine. Along with Germany, these countries form the center of Ukraine aid. In terms of gross domestic product, the Nordic and northeastern countries are Ukraine’s biggest supporters. At the center of this camp is Poland – here the threads converge not only geographically.

At the same time, the camp in East Central Europe led by Hungary, which is critical or even negative about aid to Ukraine, could expand. In addition to Hungary and Slovakia, the Czech Republic could soon be one of them, if the populist Andrei Babis triumphs again in the parliamentary elections next fall and puts the country back on a more Moscow-friendly course. That’s what observers fear.

In any case, there is not much left of the Visegrad Group. The relationship with Russia has moved to the center of the regional agenda to such an extent that it is shaping the overall relationship between states, especially that between Poland and Hungary.

Different visions of Europe

Orban and Tusk also have completely different attitudes towards the EU. Orban recently declared on the short message service X that he wanted to “conquer” Brussels together with other right-wing populist movements. The Hungarian Prime Minister also maintains close relations with the Trump camp and is counting on Trump’s return to the White House.

Tusk, on the other hand, represents the EU mainstream, as does his Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. Tusk was President of the European Council, Sikorski was a member of the European Parliament. Both are committed to closer cooperation between Europeans on defense and armaments issues. Poland has been given a central task in the new EU Commission: it is responsible for the budget. Meanwhile, Hungary was downgraded from responsibility for EU enlargement to that for health and animal welfare.