Cuba seeks a way out of its worst crisis since the Revolution under pressure from the US

Blackouts for hours, long waits for fuel, problems finding food, closed hotels, hospitals that cannot offer adequate services… Cuba is going through what all experts agree is its worst crisis since the Revolution led by Fidel Castro in 1959 and it does so with few friends to turn to in the face of the pressures being exerted by Donald Trump’s Administration.

The island was already suffering a serious economic crisis, without having left behind the ravages of the COVID pandemic, but the situation has worsened after the United States military intervention in Venezuela, with the capture of its president Nicolás Maduro, and the subsequent threat by Trump that those countries that send oil to Cuba will be subject to sanctions.

As highlighted by former Uruguayan minister Ernesto Talvi in ​​an article for the Elcano Royal Institute, commercial exchange between Cuba and Venezuela registered a sharp decline between 2014 and 2024, which explains the decline experienced by the Cuban economy, which now also faces the end of the supply of Venezuelan crude oil, vital to cover its needs.

“The transformations promoted during Raúl Castro’s first government were never deep enough to influence competitiveness, attract foreign investment in a sustained manner or develop export sectors capable of offering viable alternatives to the alliance with Venezuela,” Talvi emphasizes, emphasizing that “the majority of Cuban industries continue to be monopolized by inefficient state companies and the shadowy GAESA conglomerate managed by military institutions.”

In addition, it was decided to invest mainly in tourism, especially in the construction of hotels, “without addressing other areas such as electrical and transportation infrastructure, food production and the quality and stability of complementary services” but the arrival of tourists not only has not yet recovered pre-pandemic levels but in 2025 it was reduced by 20%, explains the former minister.

DIFFERENCE WITH THE SPECIAL PERIOD

Cuba already went through another critical moment after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, which the Castro regime baptized as ‘Special Period’, losing its main international supporter. However, I was in a better position to deal with it then.

“Cuba had an infrastructure that was not so undercapitalized, with certain levels of financial reserves and inventories, and human capital in better conditions,” according to Talvi. “In addition, the political leadership enjoyed greater internal cohesion and international recognition that does not exist today,” he highlights.

The Cuban regime, headed by Miguel Díaz-Canel since 2019, seems to be running out of allies in Latin America, where in recent years leftist governments have given way to conservative leaders, with the exception of Brazil and Colombia, countries where presidential elections are scheduled this year, and Mexico. For now, only the president of the latter country, Claudia Sheinbaum, has sent humanitarian aid to the island but she has given in to pressure from Trump and there have been no new shipments of Mexican crude oil.

Nor do Russia and China, traditional partners, currently seem to be in a comfortable situation to ignore US threats if they support Havana, immersed as they are in the conflict in Ukraine and the latter in their tariff dispute with Washington. Thus, Talvi summarizes, “the regime does not have many options left and runs the risk of being left in a kind of geopolitical vacuum.”

CUBA IS NOT VENEZUELA

However, and even though both Trump and his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, have expressed their desire for a regime change on the island, encouraged by the good result of the operation in Venezuela where Washington has assumed control of the country, leaving the government in the hands of former Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, the circumstances in Cuba are very different.

“Cuba is not Venezuela,” summarizes Christopher Sabatini, Latin America expert at Chatham House in an article. The island “is not on vast oil reserves and has no untapped mineral wealth” and therefore the United States would not obtain “any great economic gain from a change of government,” he warns, emphasizing that the security argument is not valid either. “Despite its close relations with Russia, China and Iran, Cuba does not represent a threat to national security,” he maintains.

On the other hand, “six decades of totalitarian control and repression have atomized Cuban society,” according to Sabatini, who warns that “there is no democratic leadership waiting as there was in Venezuela that enjoys the popular legitimacy of an election,” in reference to the opposition leader María Corina Machado and Edmundo González, winner of the 2024 elections. Furthermore, he adds, “the small politically independent civil society remains divided and isolated internally” while many of the dissidents have had to opt for the exile

Meanwhile, according to Talvi, “every day the probability of a resurgence of large-scale protests, such as those of July 11, 2021, increases.” Then, remember, “the Government was only able to stop them by deploying police and security forces and arresting hundreds of people, many of whom joined the list of political prisoners,” a situation that he does not believe the regime is interested in repeating right now.

THE REGIME, FORCED TO NEGOTIATE

Thus, Talvi is convinced that “economic needs, military threats and the geopolitical situation will force the regime, at some point, to negotiate possible solutions with Washington.” The former Uruguayan minister sees it as feasible for Díaz-Canel to agree to release political prisoners but not to make concessions such as a democratic opening.

Emilio Morales and Juan Antonio Blanco also share the same opinion in another article for Elcano, who consider that “it is evident that (the regime) does not have much time left to make serious decisions.” “Its ability to maneuver to survive financially is zero. It is in a terminal phase and not even its repressive apparatus could sustain itself,” they maintain.

“The days of the current Cuban governance regime are numbered. They can close this story in a kind or painful way, it is the only real option available to them,” defend these two experts for whom “the only kind option would be for Raúl Castro and his family to leave the country and make way for the first phase of transition.”

Morales and Blanco maintain that the former president should know that “doing resistance stunts without being accompanied by external allies and in the absence of massive national support is suicide” since the “weak and obsolete” Cuban Army could not resist “an American surgical operation.” In addition, they remember that “he has two cases pending in Florida courts, one for drug trafficking and the other for the murder of the four Hermanos al Rescate pilots”, two of them Americans.

For now, Díaz-Canel has shown himself open to dialogue, but it does not seem that the regime is willing to make concessions. “Cuba is willing to have a dialogue with the United States, to have a dialogue on any of the issues that it wants to debate or discuss. Under what conditions? Without pressure, under pressure you cannot have dialogue,” he said on February 5.

“We are not willing to discuss our constitutional system just as we assume that the United States is not willing to discuss its constitutional system, its political system and its economic reality,” Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío told CNN that same day.