The defector exposed North Korea’s secret system

In the employee database of a company from California, he was another face among dozens of remote workers – a prolific software developer with a meticulous LinkedIn profile and an IP address that leads to the Midwest of the United States. In reality, Anton Ko was a North Korean agent who worked in China on behalf of the North Korean government as part of a broad plan by the country’s regime to deceive the technology industry and collect hundreds of millions of dollars that could be used to strengthen the military. In an extensive article in the Wall Street Journal, the sophisticated plan of North Korea was presented, and a rare interview with one of the employees who defected to South Korea.

According to the report, Anton Ko was part of a group of North Korean programmers and cyber people who were tracked down, trained and sent abroad by Kim Jong-un’s regime. Their mission was to funnel foreign money into Pyongyang’s desperate economy by obtaining technology jobs while stealing the identities of foreign nationals.

More than 40 countries were targeted by North Korea, according to an American-led partnership that includes 11 countries and documents Pyongyang’s sanctions violations, with American companies being the most desirable – both in terms of reward and in terms of their intelligence value. Google estimated that the agents managed to penetrate hundreds of the largest companies in the world.

The defector told the Wall Street Journal that the agents operate mainly from China and Russia, where the Internet connection is stronger and does not trace directly to North Korea. According to estimates, in 2024 these activities generated up to 800 million dollars for the regime – a significant amount for an economically failed country that invests a lot of effort in military strengthening. A researcher who spoke to the American newspaper and talked to defectors, revealed that the regime in Pyongyang confiscates up to 90% of the income of each employee.

To appear more credible to employers, the agents pay American citizens to host “computer farms” – homes to which work computers from American companies are sent, and where the agents connect remotely so that they appear to be employees operating from within the United States. In November, the US Department of Justice announced that four Americans had pleaded guilty to helping North Korean technology workers hold jobs at more than 136 American companies. In addition, the agents recruited software developers Westerners who will apply on their behalf and even appear in video meetings with the company – in return they received payment without doing any work.

According to Ko, the mission abroad provided him with conditions that were almost impossible in North Korea, including a steady supply of electricity, nutritious food and Internet access. Upon his arrival in China, he worked up to 16 hours a day alongside about 10 other agents who were crammed into a two-room apartment with bunk beds and computers. The income each employee generated was strictly documented – once a month a meeting was held, and at the end envelopes containing only 10% of the salary were distributed, some relative to the employees.

According to a report from 2025, the agents were subject to constant supervision, lack of sleep and heavy pressure to meet targets. During the work week they were only allowed to go outside for short walks, and once every two or three years the workers were returned to Pyongyang for a month of “re-education”, to strengthen their loyalty after exposure to foreign information.

According to Ko, his loyalty to the regime began to waver shortly after his first Google searches. He searched for the name of the former leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-il, and was surprised to find out about his activities. The forbidden information was also revealed to him to recalculate a route – and led to a rare defection.