Nuclear deterrence: five questions and their answers before Emmanuel Macron’s highly anticipated speech

A careful image, meticulously prepared, to support a particularly anticipated speech. Scrutinized by our European partners as well as by our adversaries, Russia in the lead. Monday March 2 afternoon, it is in front of a nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), in the Île Longue basin (Finistère), that Emmanuel Macron will speak on French nuclear deterrence. A doctrine formalized by General de Gaulle in 1959 and regularly revised by his successors at the Élysée, including Emmanuel Macron, already in February 2020.

How is the French nuclear deterrent composed?

After the abandonment of its land component in 1996, it now rests on its oceanic and airborne pillars. France has four nuclear missile-launching submarines, which have been permanently at sea since 1972. Created in 1964, the strategic air forces guarantee permanence in the air: the Rafales equipped with nuclear missiles are on alert 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Furthermore, some are positioned on the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle – currently deployed in the North Sea – as part of the force naval aviation.

The nuclear arsenal is established according to the principle of “strict sufficiency”, namely that it must make it possible to cause “unacceptable damage” to any adversary, contravening the “vital interests” of the Nation. “Damage which has nothing to do, in its effect, with what we see from Russian strikes in Ukraine, or that we have seen from Israeli strikes in Iran,” specifies the Élysée.

The number of nuclear warheads available is estimated at 300. A figure to compare with the ceiling (1,550) authorized for the United States and Russia, within the framework of the New Start treaty which has just expired.

Are our means sufficient?

It is a debate that rages, particularly within the framework of NATO, where the American nuclear umbrella no longer seems as reliable as it was during the Cold War. In fact, French nuclear deterrence, even coupled with that available to the British, cannot today replace it.

But Emmanuel Macron carried out, in 2017, the “complete renewal of French nuclear forces”, recalls the Élysée. Expected in 2035, a new nuclear missile submarine, called third generation, is under construction in Cherbourg. The missiles and nuclear warheads will also be renovated, and the Luxeuil air base (Haute-Saône) will be brought up to standard to be able to accommodate, within nine years, Rafales equipped with nuclear warheads.

What are our “vital interests”?

No President of the Republic, head of the Armed Forces, has ever specified what this formula covers, ambiguity itself being part of deterrence. Emmanuel Macron should take it up in his speech, expected Monday March 2, and recall that it includes a “European dimension”. The German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, and the Swedish government have had discussions on this subject with the Élysée.

If the question of a “European deterrent” is being raised with increasing urgency, it is firstly because Russia continues to be “very aggressive” in Europe: using nuclear rhetoric in the war it is waging in Ukraine, it has developed new nuclear weapons and redefined its doctrine (in 2024). But it is also because the Americans, now focused on the Indo-Pacific, are asking the Europeans to play a greater part in their security.

Who decides on nuclear fire?

The decision to press, or not, the nuclear button rests with the President of the Republic, and him alone. A “sovereign” act, which is an “invariant” of French deterrence, we insist at the Élysée: “Because this decision is extraordinary, it cannot be taken by a college of decision-makers, but by a single person,” defends a source at the Palace.

In fact, even if the British were able to participate last winter in an exercise led by the French armies, they only had the status of “observers”. This opening to certain European countries, members of NATO, could be expected to happen again. Emmanuel Macron had already noted the principle during his previous speech, in 2020.

How much does the French nuclear deterrent cost?

The budget for nuclear forces rose, in 2025, to 7 billion euros, or around 13% of the current defense budget. If it can evolve in the coming years, this should be done at the margin, its cost being smoothed within the framework of the military programming law.