Who really decides in Tehran: the closed circle that runs Iran

Ahead of the opening of the negotiation talks in Islamabad, not only the nuclear issue and sanctions are on the table – but also the question of who even makes the decisions in Tehran. Behind the public statements, there is a small circle of senior officials, at the center of which stands Supreme Leader Mujtaba Khamenei, and next to him are other players who shape the line. N12, together with Dr. Raz Zimat and Danny Sitrinowitz from the INSS, maps the centers of power upon which Yashak Dvar will operate.

Ali Khamenei’s son, appointed to replace him as supreme leader on March 9, after his father was killed on February 28 in the opening blow of the war. The 56-year-old Khamenei is deeply connected to the political and security institutions of the Islamic Republic and in particular to the Revolutionary Guards.

Dr. Raz Zimet, director of the Iran program and the Shiite axis at INSS, tells N12: “Mujataba makes decisions in a meaningful way, but there is difficulty in reaching him, understanding what he wants and how communication with him is conducted in general, possibly by passing notes.”

He also notes that “the change of the last week was made possible mainly thanks to the change in the position of Mujtaba who makes the final decision, which allowed a breakthrough – to go to a ceasefire”.

Danny (Dennis) Sitrinowitz, a senior researcher at INSS, mentions: “The smallest first circle is Mujtaba who needs to sign the things. It is likely that he will try to create continuity and present his father’s positions in the negotiations and therefore, it is very doubtful that we will see a change in the Iranian position here and there.”

He has been in office since 2020, after being elected by a large majority, and is considered one of the oldest and most influential political figures in Iran. Kalibaf is identified with the security establishment and over the years was close to the supreme leader’s office and the Revolutionary Guards. During the war, he stood out in a firm and hawkish line towards Israel and the USA.

Dr. Zimet says that “Kalibaf is a key factor at the top of the government in Iran, and he can be defined as number 2 in the system.” Alongside this, he emphasizes that he also does not act alone, and apparently needs to get approval from the military echelon, Ahmed Vahidi, commander of the Revolutionary Guards.

Vahidi was appointed to the position following a wave of assassinations that hit the Iranian elite, he is a veteran of the Revolutionary Guards since the 1970s, served in the past as commander of the Quds Force, Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior under Raisi. He has been on the Interpol list since 2007 on suspicion of involvement in the attack on the Jewish community building in Buenos Aires in 1994, in which 85 people were killed. ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

Elected president in 2024 and identified with the relatively pragmatic camp in the Iranian system. Pazkhian comes from a medical background and previously served as Minister of Health, and later as a member of parliament for a long time. Despite a more moderate image, his powers are limited – especially in the fields of foreign affairs and security, which are controlled by the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards. His role is mainly focused on managing the government and the economy, and representing the regime’s official line to the outside world.

One of the key people in Iran’s political arena. He was one of the prominent figures in the negotiating team for the nuclear agreement and will participate in the talks in Islamabad, where he represented Iran in the diplomatic contacts. Despite his central role in conducting the talks and conveying the messages to the outside world, he acts according to the lines dictated by the senior leadership.

Dr. Zimet points out that “Iranian President Massoud Pazkhian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi are active and dominant figures in the political arena, but the decision-making process in Tehran is mostly based on consensus – even if behind the scenes there are arguments between the various parties.”

“Ahmed Vahidi represents the more radical line, while Mujtaba Khamenei is seen as close to the same camp, but one who is willing to demonstrate tactical flexibility. On the other hand, Pazkhian and Arakachi are identified with a more pragmatic approach.”

According to Citrinovitch, “Pazkhian and Arakachi represent a more pragmatic line within the system. However, their degree of influence is limited and derived from their proximity to the real centers of power, headed by Mujtaba Khamenei. The closer the connection to him, the greater the ability to influence decision-making. The Iranians come to the negotiations with a sense of victory and impose their terms in the negotiations.”