The Iranian regime has decided on its presidential candidates. Six people were allowed to participate in the elections: Speaker of the Parliament (Majlis) Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Mayor of Tehran Alireza Zakani, representative of the spiritual leader in the Security Council of the Islamic Republic Said Jalili, Member of Parliament Masoud Pezeshkiyan, former Iranian prosecutor Mustafa Pourmohammadi and Vice President Gazizadeh Hashemi.
Who is the favorite among them, will Iran’s foreign policy change, what is the overall situation in the Middle East from the point of view of the Iranian regime – these questions were answered by Dr. Raz Zimt, an expert on Iran, an employee of the Alliance Center for Iran Studies at Tel Aviv University and Institute for National Security Studies.
Interviewed by Mikhail Borodkin, editor-in-chief of Oriental Express.
What main conclusions can be drawn from the approved list of Iranian presidential candidates?
The first thing that catches your eye is that among the candidates there is only one reformist, Pezeshkiyan. This means that the regime seeks to maintain hegemony in all state institutions, including the post of president. This is also indicated by the exclusion of Ali Larijani from the elections, although this time it was expected that he would still be allowed to participate in the elections. The regime does not want to allow anyone into the presidency who, from its point of view, could create any difficulties.
On the other hand, unlike the 2021 elections, the outcome of which was completely clear in advance because Raisi was the clear leader of the race, now the result is not so clear. There are three obvious favorites, and these are Ghalibaf, Jalili and the aforementioned Pezeshkiyan. Of these, Ghalibaf’s chances are considered higher, but still victory is not guaranteed. The result depends mainly on voter turnout.
On turnout or on what result Khamenei “orders”?
The Iranian regime does not usually engage in direct manipulation of results. Intervention or attempt to organize the desired outcome of elections occurs in the previous stages. Once the list of candidates is approved, the regime does not interfere. The only exception was the 2009 elections, when there were signs of fraud. Therefore, the fact that Pezeshkiyan participated in the elections may indicate either that the regime does not believe in his victory, or that it is willing to take a calculated risk.
Perhaps they want to use it to increase turnout.
Yes, that’s right. The regime creates the impression that there is competition in elections. The calculation may not come true; there may be surprises in the elections, which was not the case three years ago, when the regime was categorically not going to take risks and made a clear bet on Raisi. There is an opinion that he was indeed promoted to succeed Khamenei, although there is no official confirmation of this. This time we don’t see such a clear favorite.
I have a theory that Pourmohammadi should win for two reasons. Firstly, he is the only representative of the clergy among the candidates, and all presidents, except Ahmadinejad, were from the clergy. Secondly, he looks like Raisi’s double – also from the legal system, he was also on the “death commission”. Raisi has been a convenient president for Khamenei, and Pourmohammadi looks like a reliable replacement.
Your theory may turn out to be correct, but I still think that if the regime promoted Pourmohammadi, then it would not have strong competitors in these elections, but there are some. Pourmohammadi himself has no public support. Ghalibaf, in contrast, relies on some circles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, he has some electoral popularity, and Pourmohammadi is not his opponent in these elections.
To what extent can we even talk about some kind of confrontation or struggle for power between the IRGC generals and the clergy? Can we call them warring factions? Is it possible, in the event of a Ghalibaf victory, to consider that the IRGC faction has the upper hand?
There is a struggle within the conservative elite, but not between generals and ayatollahs. Ghalibaf, for example, is considered a representative of the IRGC, but the IRGC is not a monolith. Some Ksirovites will probably support not him, but Said Jalili, who is considered more radical. We cannot call the clergy a large separate influential force. Let’s say Ghalibaf wins the elections, and perhaps this will indicate a certain strengthening of the IRGC’s position, but still, let’s not forget that Raisi won three years ago (one of his rivals was Mohsen Rezaei, ex-commander of the IRGC – M.B.).
I would also like to say that there were two opinions regarding that victory of Raisi. One argued that he was made president with the expectation that he would succeed Khamenei when the time came. It is quite possible. But another opinion said that Khamenei wanted to make a weak politician president, so that during the change of rahbar, the president would not interfere with the candidate preferred by Khamenei, the Council of Experts, the IRGC, or all of them together.
Ghalibaf in this regard may present them with unpleasant surprises. He is, of course, a conservative, but as mayor of Tehran he was very pragmatic. His loyalty to Khameneni is not the same as Raisi’s. However, it is very difficult to find someone as faithful as Raisi. True, as you said, perhaps Pourmohammadi is the same, but among the leading candidates, Jalili is radical even by Khamenei’s standards, and Pezeshkiyan is too moderate. Ghalibaf may be suitable, but as the least evil of the three.
It must be admitted that the Iranian system is facing a severe crisis. No one expected such a sudden catastrophe and the death of Raisi, so the regime had to quickly look for candidates capable of taking on this role.
Will the new president change anything in negotiations with the West on the nuclear program?
As you know, foreign policy is determined by the rahbar, not the president. The president has indirect influence through the National Security Council, which he chairs and which has several members he appoints. The Council as such can soften or harden the position.
But there is another point. The situation in the sphere of the Iranian nuclear program is determined, in many respects, by external factors – elections in the United States, the confrontation with Israel, as well as regional politics, the latter, by the way, is determined and implemented by the IRGC, and not by the president. So the personality of the president matters less in these negotiations.
Could the appointment of the relatively moderate Ali Shamkhani in charge of negotiations with the West signal a willingness to make concessions?
There is a lot of uncertainty about the purpose. There is no direct confirmation of this; Iranian sources reported this rather vaguely, saying that he is part of the group overseeing the negotiations. Either they appointed it or they denied it. If this is true, then Shamkhani can have a little influence on the situation, because he is Khamenei’s adviser, and the rahbar listens to his advisers. But as far as I understand, this is still the jurisdiction of the National Security Council.
Overall, one gets the impression that Iran is doing very well in the region and on the global stage. From Tehran’s point of view, Israel is bogged down in Gaza, Hezbollah is increasing pressure every day, Yemen’s Houthis are acting unopposed, Iran itself fired missiles at Israel and did not suffer anything for it, and the alliance with Russia provides economic benefits.
Unfortunately, you are absolutely right. The Iranian regime’s self-confidence is growing. They believe that Israel is stuck in a war of attrition in Gaza and Lebanon, unable to achieve its goals and does not know how to get out of this quagmire. Meanwhile, Iran is forging closer relations with Russia and China, although not without problems, but this alliance helps it neutralize American pressure. At the same time, Iran is restoring relations with Arab countries – this has already been done with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and now there is information about the possible restoration of relations with Egypt and Bahrain.
Although the rocket attack on the night of April 14 was accompanied by tactical failures in the form of those missiles that exploded in Iran itself, overall Tehran considers this incident a very successful one.
So the strategic position suits them quite well. In general, throughout the so-called “axis of resistance” there is growing confidence that the balance of power is changing in their favor. I do not agree with the dire predictions of Avigdor Lieberman and Gideon Saar that within two or three years Iran will try to inflict another Holocaust on Israel, but this axis does believe that they have a historic opportunity to try to achieve their goal of destroying Israel.
Israel must find new ways to counter the Iranian threat. It is necessary to restore the process of normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia, in parallel with the destruction of the potential of Hamas, and to form a new regional alliance, but for now all this seems unlikely.
Is there a chance that Iran will try to complete its nuclear program in time for the US elections?
Iran is on the verge of becoming a military nuclear power. But they consider taking the last step too risky, since there is a high probability that they will not be able to keep these actions secret. At the moment I see no reason why they would rush, but in the future this, unfortunately, may happen.