Coup at the start of Hungary’s Council Presidency

Hungary’s EU Council Presidency begins with a coup. Just one day after taking over the office, which rotates every six months, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban traveled to Kyiv on Tuesday for a surprise visit.

The focus of the short visit, which lasted only a few hours, was a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. In a brief statement after the conversation, Orban spoke out in favor of a ceasefire along the current front line. This would speed up future peace talks.

The Ukrainian president, who has always made the restoration of his country’s territorial integrity a precondition for a peace process, did not respond to this proposal in front of the press. However, Zelensky held out the prospect of an agreement to promote bilateral relations.

Consistent obstruction policy

At least as important as the content of the talks is their symbolic value. It is Orban’s first trip to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s invasion in February 2022 and his first official bilateral meeting with Zelensky ever. The two politicians last met briefly on the sidelines of the inauguration of Argentine President Javier Milei in Buenos Aires in December.

Since the beginning of the war, Orban has opposed military support for Ukraine and has repeatedly accused the West of not being interested in a peaceful solution. But he never mentioned the most obvious way to end the war – Moscow’s recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty and the withdrawal of all Russian troops from the country.

Orban also made it difficult to find a common security policy response to the Russian threat by, for example, blocking Sweden’s accession to NATO for a long time. He also refused to grant Kiev the status of an EU accession candidate. Orban is in favor of expanding the Union, but is primarily focusing on the Western Balkan states, especially Serbia. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic is a close ally of Orban and also has a similar understanding of democracy.

Orban also continues to maintain close contact with Moscow. He last met Putin in October at an event in Beijing on the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. The Hungarian head of government also maintains excellent relations with China, the West’s second major geopolitical rival. All of this has earned the head of government of the EU and NATO state Hungary the reputation of being more of an ally of Putin than of the West.

Budapest and Kiev are also arguing about bilateral issues. These include a Ukrainian minority law that sets higher hurdles for classes not held in Ukrainian. The law is primarily intended to strengthen the national language over Russian, which is still widely spoken in the south and east of the country. But it also affects minorities such as Hungarians and Romanians in western Ukraine.

Whether Orban’s criticism, which was justified in principle, was primarily about protecting minorities or whether the controversy also served as a pretext for his general policy of obstruction is a matter of debate among observers. In Romania, the Ukrainian language law also initially caused a stir. However, after adjustments were made to address the most important points of criticism, the issue has largely disappeared from the public debate.

Orban has given in

The trip to Kyiv will now help ease the difficult relationship between the two neighbors. But that is not the only goal. Orban’s obstructionist policy has kicked up a lot of dust on the Ukraine issue. But the Hungarian head of government has not achieved much for his country.

Although he managed to force some of the blocked funds from the Cohesion Fund to be released with his initial veto against the Ukraine aid package, he ultimately had to give up his resistance in most other areas without getting anything in return. This applies to the Russia sanctions, which Hungary is supporting with gritted teeth, the EU billions for arms purchases, and Sweden’s accession to NATO, where Orban also had to give in after Turkey agreed.

Here, the different power and dependency relationships became particularly clear. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan saw the application for membership from Stockholm as an early opportunity to extract concessions from the West. Orban hoped to be able to do the same. But Hungary is not Turkey.

For geographical reasons alone, Ankara is a key player in security policy in the Black Sea region and also has NATO’s second-largest army. In addition, the West has come to terms with the fact that cooperation with Turkey under Erdogan is primarily transactional. This does not apply to the small Central European EU state of Hungary.

A way out of isolation?

Orban has overestimated the weight of his country and has largely isolated it within the EU. Despite the general shift to the right, the European elections have not brought the hoped-for liberation. Orban’s party Fidesz suffered losses in Hungary. Above all, Fidesz failed in its goal of joining the national conservative group of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR).

An important reason for this was Orban’s pro-Russian policy. The strongest force within the ECR is the party of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, a staunch supporter of Ukraine. Against this background, the fact that Orban is now seeking to establish a new right-wing nationalist faction together with the Freedom Party from Austria and the party of former Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis seems more like a stopgap solution.

In Budapest, it is likely that the conclusion has been reached that a somewhat more constructive Ukraine policy will strengthen Hungary’s position within the EU, especially during the Council Presidency. This does not make the opportunist Orban an easy partner, and certainly not an ardent supporter of Ukraine. Nevertheless, Brussels and Kiev should breathe a little easier.