Europe’s politics without leadership: The EU at a crossroads

The position of European leadership remains vacant. The French president, who is determined to take on this position, has just suffered a serious blow at home that will probably make him a lame duck for the remainder of his term until 2027.

In the best case scenario, the French parliament will more or less block itself in the coming years; in the worst case scenario, Macron will have to deal with a Prime Minister Jordan Bardella from the right-wing populist Rassemblement national (RN), who will do everything in his power to make the president look bad in preparation for the 2027 presidential election campaign.

The German Chancellor, meanwhile, has no discernible ambitions to lead in Europe. While his predecessor Angela Merkel often dominated the meetings of EU heads of state and government and received much recognition for her skillful moderation, Scholz keeps his European policy to a minimum. He has no discernible agenda of his own, no claim to influence. He is mostly only concerned with preventing decisions that would not be supported by his own fragile and increasingly disparate coalition.

A dynamic world of powers

Without initiatives from the most important EU capitals, Berlin and Paris, Europe risks remaining stuck in the past in a rapidly changing world. The USA is developing dynamically: with technological revolutions, with a new industrial policy and with new positioning in the geopolitical tensions emanating from the revisionist autocracies of Russia and China.

China and Russia, in turn, are directly challenging the Europeans, in different ways but increasingly in tandem. Russia with its attempt to reverse the reorganization of Europe after the Cold War and to dominate Eastern and, in the long term, Central and Eastern Europe again. China with its efforts to maintain Europe as a willing sales market for its own overproduction and at the same time to neutralize it geopolitically, in particular by splitting it off from the USA.

A return to a purely national way of navigating this geoeconomic and geopolitical landscape is not an option for EU members: they are far too deeply intertwined and in far too many areas they have institutionalised a common approach. This is particularly true for the common market and the associated common trade policy.

Playing the national card therefore comes at the price of significant economic losses, as the British have experienced. The reason why Brexit has not been copied is because it was not a success story. Most right-wing populists in Europe have therefore come to terms with the existence of the EU.

But the big EU ship must be steered. This is more important today than ever before. In the past, the waters were mostly calm. America provided a secure environment and was responsible for the overall geopolitical strategy. Within this given framework, the EU was able to focus on ever deeper economic integration and on a mutual opening of societies with ever fewer reservations. Today, this framework is being called into question.

New geopolitical rules

The Biden administration has once again taken on the classic American role and led the way in parrying Russia’s attack on Ukraine. The Europeans only had to adapt to the American strategy and make their contribution. But at the same time, there are increasing signs that this situation is the exception to the new rule, which is that the Europeans must first and foremost help themselves and act independently geopolitically in order to keep America in the game as a close partner.

This is where the EU comes in, which is now under pressure to change its character: from an instrument of socio-economic integration to an instrument of joint geopolitical action – with a focus on foreign and security policy.

The latter, however, is the domain of the EU states. And they are not prepared to “communalize” their geopolitical interests. The “method” that works in economic, trade and monetary policy and has led to joint action does not work in foreign and security policy, where the visible, vital interests of states are at stake.

The EU’s role in foreign and security policy therefore remains very limited. Europe’s capitals will not cede their sovereignty in this area to Brussels.

What the EU can be, however, is a platform on which states coordinate their foreign and security policies, explore opportunities for joint action and use existing mechanisms and institutions to pursue common goals more effectively. This is particularly true in those areas of foreign and security policy in which an economic dimension comes into play. Here the EU has a solid role and has strengths.

Geopolitically, the EU can only be controlled from the capitals, especially the large ones. The classic engines that set the EU in motion are Berlin and Paris. If the two agree, they can usually pull the others along. The current lack of drive in Paris and Berlin is therefore a problem.

Where threats grow, however, the saving power often grows. The good news is that with Ursula von der Leyen as President of the EU Commission for a second term and with Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas as head of EU foreign policy, the EU heads of state and government have nominated two top people who will in all probability work well together and who bring with them a freedom-oriented geopolitical compass. They will be determined to assert European interests and values ​​against an aggressive Russia and an imperial China.

Europe’s values ​​and interests

Before heading the EU Commission, Ursula von der Leyen was German Minister of Defense from 2013 to 2019. Since the Russian troop build-up on Ukraine’s borders in 2021, she has worked closely with the United States and advocated for Ukraine. She takes a critical stance toward China, which is often undermined by Paris and Berlin – who continue to rely on China as a partner.

But her approach of de-risking and greater skepticism is increasingly gaining ground. Von der Leyen stands for a geopolitical approach that is determined to assert the values ​​and interests of a liberal West against the claims to power of the powerful autocracies of Russia and China.

With Kaja Kallas, the EU states have nominated a foreign policy representative who is clearly committed to rejecting Russian aggression and intimidation. The Estonian Prime Minister, whose mother was deported to Siberia during Soviet times, will be a clear advocate among the EU foreign ministers for a clear stance against Russian neo-imperialism.

Von der Leyen and Kallas still have to be confirmed by the EU Parliament. And both have to get along with the President of the European Council, who convenes and chairs the meetings of the EU heads of state and government, the Portuguese António Costa. Everything indicates that Costa will be a partner, not a competitor for von der Leyen, unlike the current incumbent Charles Michel.

A geopolitically enlightened team in the EU’s leadership roles is a prerequisite for positioning Europe in a new era. But without the political will from the capitals, the Brussels institutions can achieve little.

At least in Warsaw, a heavyweight is back in office: Donald Tusk, who was President of the European Council from 2014 to 2019. Poland may be too small to lead, but it is the key country in Central and Eastern Europe, and Tusk has the experience to be able to use Poland’s weight to the maximum. A ray of hope, at least.