Trump’s threat made Europe wake up – This could change everything

President of the United States Donald Trump’s The exits that destroy NATO and the Greenland talks have caused Europeans to doubt the validity of NATO’s collective defense.

Trump’s policy and the crumbling of the US alliance have also made the EU consider activating its own defense clause.

Article 42.7 of the EU Charter obliges EU member states to help another member state if it is the target of an armed attack: “If a member state is the target of an armed attack on its territory, the other member states are obliged to give it aid and support with all available means in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.”

Article 42.7 has so far been activated only once by France in 2015 after the terrorist attacks in Paris.

Along with France, a strong advocate of Article 42.7 over the years has been the president Sauli Niinistö. During his presidency (2012–2024), and before Finland joined NATO (2023), Niinistö considered the EU article even stronger than the article guaranteeing NATO’s collective defense, because the union article concerns member countries and is based on mutual aid.

In 2015, Niinistö seemed clearly satisfied when France activated Article 42.7 of the EU for the first time.

In Finland’s NATO addiction, the EU article guaranteeing NATO’s collective defense fell short, but during Trump’s second presidential term, it has been dug out of mothballs again.

Although Article 42.7 is morally and politically strong, its problem is the ambiguity of practical implementation: the article obliges to help, but does not specify how.

Cyprus, now holding the EU presidency, wants clarity on the use of the article. The reason is clear: Cyprus needs additional security. It is not a member of NATO and was hit by Iranian drone attacks in the early stages of the Iran war.

The EU leaders gathered in Cyprus on Thursday evening will get an overview of how the common defense article could be used.

Some EU countries are worried that the situation might irritate Trump, and thereby weaken the validity of NATO’s Article 5.

The discussion atmosphere is described as sensitive. The EU emphasizes that the scenarios tested by the Union in relation to the mutual assistance clause are not intended to replace NATO’s Article Five, and the Union’s assistance clause does not limit the obligations of EU member states that are NATO members.

In NATO, on the other hand, it is reminded that the EU’s assistance clause is bilateral between the member states, while NATO’s article five guarantees collective defense: if an armed attack is made against one NATO member country, it is considered an attack against all members of the alliance.

However, with Trump’s threats, faith in the validity of Article 5 has also begun to waver in NATO. A NATO diplomat recently assessed NATO’s Article 5 status by admitting that now it would be to Vladimir Putin a good moment to test the validity of NATO’s collective defense, because NATO’s deck is messed up, but this is unlikely to happen, because Putin is caught up in the Ukraine war.

According to the diplomat, in relation to Trump, NATO lives in “virtual reality”. It means that the US military leadership and parts of the administration still understand the value of NATO and European allies, but Trump’s actions cannot be known.

In a few years, Russia will be stronger and can test NATO. By then, the defense and deterrence of a more European NATO should be in order.

However, according to NATO and EU sources, this does not mean that a defense alliance competing with NATO would be built in the EU, because NATO already has a functioning mechanism, and the money and resources are not enough to create double functions.

Despite this, efforts are being made to strengthen the implementation of the EU’s mutual assistance clause.

The work on the operational implementation of Article 42.7 of the EU continues so that after the EU leaders have discussed the article on Thursday in Cyprus, the article will then be tested in exercises for ambassadors and defense ministers in May.

The EU’s foreign affairs administration records the findings, and in the end a clearer line on Article 42.7 may end up being part of the EU’s new security strategy, which the Commission should present after the NATO meeting in Ankara in July.