Macron is looking for a new foreign policy strategy after withdrawing from Africa

There is no shortage of foreign policy ideas and initiatives from Paris. Whether Macron is announcing an ultimatum to the warring parties in Lebanon, declaring NATO “brain dead,” wanting to make Europe “sovereign,” proclaiming a “third way” between the USA and China in Asia or sending ground troops into a hot war with Russia does not want to rule out, as a signal of “strategic ambivalence”. Even if little or nothing comes of it in the end, every new idea is staged with great dedication.

With his restlessness, Macron is of course reacting to a real dilemma. France lacks an overarching strategy that guides daily practical action. Everything has become questionable: the special relationship with Africa and the Mediterranean, the close ties to an America that is always viewed with skepticism and jealousy, the traditional European policy in tandem with Germany. At the same time, the question arises about France’s role in the future region of Asia.

For decades, the special relationship with Africa was the pillar of French foreign policy. Colonial traditions often mixed with economic interests in the fabric of the so-called Françafrique.

But the region is no longer focused on Paris; the old ties to Paris have faded. The USA, China and, more recently, Russia have long played a more important role for the sub-Saharan countries than France.

Withdrawal from Africa

This is reflected in France’s military commitment. In 1970, France had 20,000 soldiers stationed in Africa; today there are still 31,000 in four bases: in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Chad and Djibouti. In 2023, French troops had to withdraw from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

The causes are manifold. France is increasingly less willing to support dictators. This role is now being played by Russia, which receives access to natural resources in return for securing the regime. Russia is accelerating France’s withdrawal using propaganda that paints France as an exploitative colonial power. This further strengthens existing anti-French sentiments among the population.

France is also just one of many players in the Mediterranean region. Relations with Algeria and Morocco are always tense. In Libya, Macron had unilaterally relied on the warlord Haftar, but he was unable to prevail against the central government in Tripoli, which was militarily supported by Turkey. Even in Lebanon, which was once closely linked to France, Paris no longer has much political influence.

Africa and the Mediterranean are no longer France’s “backyard”. And the attempt to increase French influence through Europeanization, through the inclusion of European partners, has visibly failed with the withdrawal from Mali.

France’s foreign policy will retain a focus on Africa, and the Mediterranean remains an important reference area for France, just as it is for Italy or Spain, for geographical reasons alone. But the south will have a different status for Paris than in the past. Once France was in a privileged position, it has become a player among many others.

Focus on Europe

Against this background, Macron has focused on Europe. From a power politics perspective, Brexit and the fading of American supremacy in Europe give Paris an opportunity to establish France as a leading power on the continent. The tactical task is to persuade Germany, its economically stronger neighbor, to follow France’s strategic lead.

For Macron, a French-led sovereign or autonomous EU is the answer to today’s geopolitical crises. Europe should establish itself as an independent third pole, alongside the USA and China. France’s classic power political ambitions are combined with an idealistic pro-EU rhetoric that is well received in many places in Europe.

But France is not making any progress in substance. In Macron’s mind, Trump’s first term should have been the moment in which his vision of the EU as an independent bloc made significant progress. Although Macron’s ideas attracted a lot of interest, they did not result in a concrete project.

Eastern Europe in particular remained oriented towards America as a protective power. Rightly so, as it turned out when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. It was not Europe, but America that saved Ukraine from ruin by supplying arms.

Macron’s vision of a sovereign world power, Europe, was based on the premise that Russia would have to give up its hostility. Because as long as Russia was hostile, America had to continue to protect Europe. That’s why Macron has been trying for years to win Putin over to a new, cooperative security order in repeated charm offensives. Russia, however, did not take France particularly seriously. And the French efforts led to massive irritation in East Central Europe.

Macron is now drawing conclusions from the failure of this project. The French president is trying to build trust among East Central Europeans who have been shaken to the core by Russia’s war of aggression. Macron is currently acting like the president of a leading and guarantor power by concluding security pacts with Armenia and Moldova and not wanting to rule out sending troops to Ukraine. He is also likely to have Trump in mind for a second term in office – for him a second chance to make Europe independent of America.

Asia in view

Another area of ​​increased French involvement in recent years is Asia. France sees itself as an Indo-Pacific power because islands in the Indian Ocean are part of its territory with extensive exclusive economic zones in which a total of 1.6 million French people live.

In the region, Macron has tried to position France as an alternative to China and the USA, as a representative of a “third way”. “We live in the jungle and have two large elephants who are becoming more and more nervous,” said the French President in November 2022 in Bangkok. France’s Indo-Pacific strategy aims to build a “dynamic balance” in this environment, “stability and equilibrium” instead of the hegemony of China and the USA and their confrontation.

However, Macron was reminded of how small France’s weight in the region actually is when Australia canceled the purchase of French submarines in September 2021 because it had opted for a comprehensive security pact with the USA and Great Britain (Aukus). The break with Australia, dramatically orchestrated by Macron, has now been repaired because France has to come to terms with the realities of power politics if it wants to stay in the game.

Macron is exaggerating

Aukus drama is symptomatic. The French president is doing his best to play in the top international league, but he is regularly exaggerating. The self-image of a world power is often brutally trimmed.

The dilemma of not being able to fulfill one’s own demands is well known for France. After the ignominious defeat against Germany in 1940, Charles de Gaulle tried to restore the self-confidence of a great power to France, which had been liberated from American troops after the Second World War. France was given a seat on the UN Security Council (at British insistence) and became a nuclear power. But at the same time, since decolonization at the latest, Paris has had less and less of a role in the major global political decisions, France has integrated itself into the American-influenced and led order of the West, and in Europe Germany has overtaken France, at least economically.

Today, France has little influence beyond Europe. And in Europe, its claim to leadership is barely getting through. But baking smaller rolls is out of the question for the ambitious, restless Macron. Like Sisyphus, in the three years remaining in office he will repeatedly try to turn his geopolitical fantasies into reality, in the hope of still being able to overcome the laws of gravity.