Russia is relying on a slow escalation to weaken Western support for Ukraine. Reacting to this with fear is wrong for several reasons.
Russia is becoming increasingly aggressive in Europe. In recent weeks, there have been reports of Russian sabotage actions from several European countries. In Great Britain, a warehouse containing aid supplies for Ukraine burned down, in Poland a major fire broke out in a shopping center, and there was also a fire in Lithuania. In May, the Polish authorities arrested twelve people on suspicion of sabotage.
The list is even longer: broken windows on the car of the Estonian Interior Minister, a large-scale overload attack on servers in Estonia, and preparations for attacks on military facilities in Germany. The authorities suspect Russian secret services of being responsible for all of these actions. This raises the question: does Moscow want to escalate the conflict with the West?
Attacks and sabotage are part of Russia’s hybrid warfare arsenal. This also includes information operations to influence public opinion, actions in cyberspace, military threats or political provocations. Russia and its ally Belarus are themselves instrumentalizing migrants to challenge their neighboring countries. At the end of May, three border guards were attacked in Poland, one of whom has since died.
The fact that Russia is now also relying on attacks in European countries means an intensification of hybrid warfare. It is possible that the cases have become more public in recent weeks because the Russian secret services are acting more carelessly or the security authorities in the countries concerned are doing a better job of tracking the enemy’s activities.
However, it is very plausible that the Kremlin is actually increasingly relying on physical actions in the conflict with the West. The hybrid war is in full swing. At the end of May, Moscow provoked the neighboring states with possible plans to move the maritime borders in the Baltic Sea. Shortly afterwards, Russian security personnel removed buoys in the river bordering Estonia. For several months now, there have been disruptions in the GPS signal over the Baltic Sea, which are presumably caused by Russia.
In March, Russia published a recording of an intercepted conversation between German officers, which publicly embarrassed the German army. At the beginning of May, Russia also announced that it would hold an exercise with tactical nuclear weapons for the first time since the attack on Ukraine, and linked this to the discussion about Western ground troops in Ukraine.
Successes at the front help Russia
These hybrid operations make Russia appear to be a threatening actor for Europe. Anyone who provokes Moscow, or so the picture that is being painted, exposes themselves to the danger of Russian attacks. The successes of Russian troops on the battlefield and the reports of the transition to a war economy reinforce the impression of Russia’s superiority.
Populist parties like the AfD in Germany are happy to adopt this narrative. They even warn of a third world war. This benefits the Kremlin. The more powerful and threatening Russia appears in the West, the better it is for the regime in Moscow.
The Kremlin is speculating that European countries are increasingly afraid to support Ukraine with effective weapons systems. If the Western alliance behind Ukraine crumbles, Russia has a good chance of winning the war. Russian influence operations are therefore aimed at portraying the Ukrainian leadership as corrupt and unscrupulous.
For Russia, covert actions against the West are part of the war against Ukraine. Russia, and before it the Soviet Union, have been relying on this for decades. Their goal is always the same: to polarize the population in a particular country, mobilize supporters and weaken opponents. In the best case, such means alone can achieve a change in policy or a coup.
Hybrid actions work below the threshold of war. Therefore, Russia’s escalation is by no means an indication that Moscow wants to openly attack the West. Quite the opposite. The assessment of Western intelligence services is that Russia almost certainly does not want a war with NATO at the moment. At least not yet.
Russia could put NATO to the test
The question, however, is how Russia will react if its covert warfare is unsuccessful in the long term. In Ukraine, for example, after the fall of the pro-Russian regime in 2014, Moscow tried to influence politics in its own favor using hybrid means. Without success. Then the invasion took place in 2022.
At the moment, Russia would hardly be militarily capable of waging war against a NATO state. Moscow’s highest priority is the war in Ukraine. That is why Russia is directing its actions against countries such as Great Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic.
These states provide Ukraine with a lot of support in the form of weapons and ammunition. In Germany, the deliveries are also politically controversial and there is a strong pro-Russian opposition. Operations to influence public opinion are particularly suitable there.
In Russia’s neighbours Poland, the Baltic states and Finland, covert operations are particularly suitable for stirring up fear and uncertainty in the public. In the former Soviet republics of Latvia and Estonia in particular, where large ethnic Russian minorities live, there are fears that Moscow could use these groups to instigate a military escalation.
The fire in Poland’s largest shopping center is said to have been set on Russia’s orders.
But in a few years, Russia could have rearmed and the US could increasingly focus on the Pacific region. It is therefore a plausible and widespread assumption that Russia could test NATO and its cohesion with a military provocation towards the end of the 2020s. It could also attack a militarily inferior neighboring state that was formerly part of the Soviet Union, such as Georgia or Moldova.
According to Western intelligence services, Russia is pursuing another, larger goal: it wants to reshape the European security order and challenge the values-based international order. Estonian intelligence, for example, believes that the Kremlin would see a victory in Ukraine as a green light for such a redesign.
Giving in will not make the threat disappear
Increased hybrid warfare is part of this long-term strategy. Russia wants to weaken NATO in particular. NATO itself has recognized this. In a statement from the beginning of May, the defense alliance described the Russian sabotage actions as part of a larger campaign that poses a threat to the security of member states. However, NATO states would not allow this to stop them from “continuing to support Ukraine.”
The fact that security authorities and politicians in many countries are now directly naming Russia as the perpetrator should be seen as a signal to the Kremlin. The West wants to show that it is fully aware of Russian activities and is following them. And that it is not afraid of confrontation.
This self-confident attitude is important. Ideally, it also signals to the population that Europe is prepared for the conflict with Russia and will not allow itself to be unsettled. Russian attempts to influence Europe would thus be ineffective.
The challenge, however, is that Moscow’s hybrid actions are directed against free societies. Defence readiness cannot be decreed from above; the conviction must come from within the population.
Europe must realise that there is no alternative to a comprehensive defence. A more lenient course towards Russia would not appease the regime. On the contrary: every success spurs Moscow’s desire for hegemony.
The increased hybrid actions show that the conflict with Moscow cannot be ignored. The West must prepare for a long conflict. Hopefully, it will only be fought using hybrid means.