The security danger of the Chinese drones in the IDF: “We don’t know what’s there”

But in his eyes, this is only a first step. Bargil points out that the move is mainly focused on attack drones, while other areas still rely on imports. “The next step should be to add Israeli drones to the equation as far as detection and observation are concerned,” he says, emphasizing that these are equally critical capabilities.

“We don’t really know what’s in there”

The reason for this, according to him, is not only economic or industrial, but mainly security. “When we receive drones like this from abroad, whether it’s from the East or from other places, we don’t really know what’s there,” he says. Even attempts to inspect and clean the systems do not provide a complete solution. “Even if we sterilized their electronics, we don’t really know what’s there,” he adds, explaining that the complexity of the systems makes it difficult to fully control every component and fully credit the drone.

“We wouldn’t want foreign governments to be exposed to everything we photograph,” he adds, noting that this is also an area where Israeli companies already operate. “For example, we have Aerosol in our portfolio, which produces the AeroSentinel – the quietest detection and observation drone in the world.”

The issue of drones is of course connected to the broader discussion on technological independence. Not only in the question of where it is produced, but also in the question of how much you can trust systems that originate outside the country. For certain areas, and especially those that are at the core of the operational activity, Bargil believes that the answer is clear. “It should be in-house,” he concludes. “We don’t really know what we’re getting – and we don’t want to find out on the day of the order.”