As the end of the year approaches, we are (finally) starting to glimpse some movement in the voting orientations of Italians. In today’s Agi/Youtrend Supermedia, in fact, we find ourselves faced with two opposite tendencies and which – if put in the perspective of the last month – do not seem to be attributable to banal statistical fluctuations. The first trend is the decline of Fratelli d’Italia: a not excessive drop, we are talking about half a point in two weeks, which however becomes exactly one point compared to a month ago; above all, it is the lowest figure recorded by FDI since the European elections in June.
The other trend, of the opposite sign, concerns the Democratic Party. Today’s 23.6% means growth – here too – of exactly one point compared to that of 6 weeks ago, as well as the Democrats’ best figure since the end of July. The combination of these two opposing trends means that there is currently a gap of less than 5 points between the first two parties – this too is a circumstance that has not occurred since the beginning of the summer, in the aftermath of the European vote .
Another interesting element is the fact that both the growth of the PD and the decline in FDI occur without being “compensated” by variations of the opposite sign among the allied parties: on the one hand, in fact, Forza Italia and Lega remain stable (and very, very neighbors); on the other hand, the variations among other opposition parties are also minimal. This means that in terms of the balance of power between the centre-right and centre-left areas/coalitions (and even more so between the centre-right and a hypothetical “wide field”) it is a little more balanced than what has been seen in the recent past. To date, putting together all the opposition forces (from the PD to the M5S, from AVS to the former Third Pole), they would surpass the center-right by approximately one and a half points.
Therefore, the trend that seems to emerge is – albeit slightly – unfavorable to FDI (and the centre-right majority) and favorable to the PD (and the opposition forces). But what could have triggered this dynamic? If we look at major international political eventsit seems that the Meloni Government can say it is quite satisfied: Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections, and the role played by Elon Musk – who has an excellent relationship with the Italian prime minister; the appointment of Raffaele Fitto, a Meloni loyalist, to the vice-presidency of the new EU Commission, after a long tug of war between the European political forces; the instability of the governments of France and Germany, which has made the Italian one the most stable executive among those of the large EU countries. But it’s on internal plan that recent events have brought to the fore issues that could have undermined the consensus of the centre-right.
A defeat for the Government is certainly there decision of the Constitutional Courtwhich rejected large parts of the law on differentiated autonomy; a law, moreover, very little appreciated by Italians: according to Demos, if a year ago 50% of voters judged this reform positively, by September of this year the figure had collapsed to 35%. Another controversial issue is that of centers for migrants in Albania: although the opinion of Italians is predominantly critical towards the sentences of the judiciary which have made (to date) this Government initiative substantially ineffective, it is the initiative itself that arouses more skepticism than approval among voters. And also the controversy sparked by Elon Musk (who said that the judges who authored the aforementioned sentences “must go”) met with more hostility than sharing from Italians.
The strikes of recent weeks have reopened a new clash between the unions and the Government, which has complained about the frequency of trade union demonstrations.
But the majority of Italians, according to our survey for @SkyTG24he doesn’t think so.
According to our… pic.twitter.com/zjP58Fct6d
— Youtrend (@you_trend)
December 10, 2024
A somewhat similar dynamic was seen on the occasion ofthe many strikes (including a general strike) that have taken place in recent months: on the one hand, the majority of Italians believe that the strikes were instrumental, or in any case dictated by more political than purely trade union motivations; on the other hand, however, they declare themselves highly critical of the possibility of limiting, or in any case circumscribing, the exercise of the right to strike – as recently proposed by the minister and deputy prime minister Matteo Salvini – and they have a less than enthusiastic attitude towards the budget measure.
Again: the law that makes childbearing for others (GPA) a universal crime was recently definitively approved, with great emphasis, but only 36% of Italians (Youtrend survey) are strongly against this instrument. On the other hand, measures regarding both social and civil rights that are sometimes discussed (such as the minimum wage, the ius scholae, the end of life, the consumption of soft drugs), despite recording a clear majority of Italians in favour, have been repeatedly rejected or ignored by the Government.
Yet, none of these elements constitutes in all respects a novelty capable of undermining the consensus of the centre-right political forces: the real factor that could have stirred the hitherto stagnant waters of the political balance of power could have been rather the regional elections in Emilia-Romagna and Umbria held a few weeks ago. The victory of the centre-left in both regions seems to have had – as has already happened in the past on similar occasions – a reinvigorating effect on the opposition parties, and in particular the PD; on the contrary, the aura of invincibility that the center-right has enjoyed for a long time (certainly since the victory in the general elections two years ago) seems to have been eroded, and with it the electoral attractiveness of FDI, in particular towards the more “peripheral” voters ”.