International Panorama: Runoff in Peru, more than just an important South American election

During the raw materials boom, in part of the first decade of the century, millions of Latin Americans emerged from poverty and joined the ranks of a new middle class. There was a real increase in disposable income. Brazil was a clear example, with growth in that space above 50% of the population. But since the middle of the last decade and until now, the region chained more than 10 years of almost zero growth (an average of less than 1% annually), aggravated by the pandemic and its consequent global inflation. Real incomes stagnated or fell, while the cost of living (food, energy, housing) skyrocketed.

People vote with that disappointment from one side of the political pendulum to the other, and with a widespread behavior of cross vote. It doesn’t matter who you choose, whoever it is, but by doing so you prevent the one you don’t want from arriving. The notion that we are going through a duel between left and right is, to say the least, slim. The region up to the Rio Grande is almost entirely pro-market. The real discussion is linked to the destination of income: whether it is concentrated or distributed to preserve social and individual development.

The trend that we are noticing in a vote towards harder conservative proposals is equivalent to the previous cycle towards social democratic models. Like these, in general, They failed in the purpose of balancing income, the miracle is sought on the other side, in addition to the fact that the decline scenario generates serious deformations such as increasing violence. So the legion has already expanded with Chile, Paraguay, partially Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica, among others.

Colombia has just joined with the preliminary victory in the first round of a millionaire businessman with no political experience, Abelardo de la Espriella, who beat the ruling party Iván Cepeda by just under three points. Behind the scenes of this surprising fact (this leader was unknown until very recently)tie the frustration with the government of Gustavo Petrowho arrived with a promise of profound social transformation, but the economic reality does not confirm these improvements.

Slow economic growth, added to fiscal uncertainty and persistent labor informality, has prevented the middle classes and vulnerable sectors from perceive real improvements in their pocket. At the same time, the accumulated inflation in basic products has eroded purchasing power, generating the frustration of expectations that the Latinobarómetro detects. In the other sphere, the pacification plan also failed. In this scenario, Cepeda also suffered the cost of Petro’s eccentric messages, defending the Bolivian Evo Morales in his coup offensive against President Rodrigo Paz and proposing an alleged electoral fraud without evidence for the benefit of De la Espriella, a complaint from which the official candidate quickly distanced himself.

In this scenario it is inscribed the final election in Peru next Sunday. Here the economy shows acceptable growth of almost 3%, according to OECD data, but insufficient to reduce poverty or generate quality employment at the rate that the country needs. Influential economists such as Waldo Mendoza affirm that “the main problem of the Peruvian economy is the paralysis of private investmentwhich is not due to international factors, but to the very high internal political uncertainty that we have self-generated.” His colleague Carlos Oliva denounces that “75% of our workforce operates informally. Informality is not an eternal escape valve; “It is a cement ceiling for the country’s productivity and tax collection.”

The president of the Central Bank, Julio Velarde, puts it in simpler terms: “The resilience of the Peruvian economy has limits. You cannot whistle and eat sugar cane at the same time: we cannot expect to attract investments and generate formal employment if from the political side “The rules of the game and legal security are constantly deteriorating.”

A polarized and frustrated country awaits whoever wins this Sunday: the double challenge of stabilizing governability, with a Congress in the hands of a manipulative and opportunistic majorityand resolve the fate of the income that has left a large part of the country on the sidelines of distribution. Although the candidates are tied and, therefore, rushing to the center in the last minutes, the right-wing populist Keiko Fujimori, daughter of the dictator Alberto Fujimori, is confident that her fourth attempt will land her in the House of Pizarro, as part of that trend that the region shows.

This runoff formally repeats the story of his previous chance against former president Pedro Castillo, a rural teacher protected by an alleged leftist tendency. furiously homophobic, anti-abortion and rejection of gender ideology. In the 2021 polls, the voters gave him a slight difference without stopping in that ideological hubbub, just to prevent Keiko from winning. Now it is Roberto Sánchez who challenges her, an ally of Castillo whom she admires and defends despite the failed self-coup that he led and which cost him his overthrow.

This relationship adds curiosities to the Peruvian adventure. It is still striking that the right-wing leader is the daughter of a former coup president whom she celebrates, and that her rival embraces another former coup president. That coincidence summarizes the reality of the Peruvian present better than any analysis.

Although analysts point out that the candidate feels obliged to defend her father and even his authoritarianism, doing so with such passion leaves some complicated doubts open. A South American diplomat points out to this envoy in Lima that this behavior would indicate that it is possible, and even correct, break the rules if the case warrants it; for example, if there is a popular reaction if income pressure is not relieved, as happened a few years ago and for similar reasons.

This rupture or disdain for norms is a characteristic of the new i-liberal rights, as they are defined in the global north, which tend to limit the value of institutional issues and seek—and in some cases achieve— dominate Parliament, the Judiciary and silence the press. US President Donald Trump is a significant example of these trends. Also allies in the region, such as the Salvadoran Nayib Bukele or the former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro and, further afield, the former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, among many others, who have made a ritual of these deformations. As an aside, a flock that may be orphaned if the Republican leader suffers a setback in the November midterm elections. It will be seen.

Keiko Fujimori is a leader with extensive political and legislative experience. She is not an outsider, but has been part of a very controversial status quo that it is not clear if it is in its design to transform it. He owes a lot to this Congress that made his campaign path easier. Sánchez is also experienced with five years in Parliament. But the most significant technical difference between the two, apart from the oceanic ideological visions that separate them, is that Castillo’s ally lacks a solid party structure. Nor did that erratic president have it.

At that point, Keiko is much more armedalthough it is known that he has reproached for what he considers an abandonment of his allies from the parliamentary darkness to whom he attributes the low vote he obtained in the first round: 17.1%, barely above the 16.6% of his rival. Fact of the absence, perhaps disturbing, of those adventure partners. At the moment no one knows for sure what will happen this Sunday.